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INTRODUCTION
Top-level domains (TLDs) are the right-most portion of a
web address.' For example, in "web.address.com," ".com" is the
TLD. TLDs are divided into generic TLDs (gTLDs), such as
".com" and ".net," and country-code TLDs (ccTLDs), such as
".us," ".uk," and ".ca."2 Broadly speaking, gTLDs are adminis-
tered by private entities through agreements with the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a US-
based nonprofit corporation.3 ccTLDs, in contrast, are adminis-
tered either by the government associated with a particular
ccTLD or by a designated private entity.4
Despite the importance of the domain name system (DNS)
to the Internet, the legal status of TLDs is uncertain. Few cases
have addressed the related legal issues; courts have not arrived
at a consensus regarding either the property status of TLDs or,
if TLDs are property, who actually owns a given TLD.5 Some
t BA 2011, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2016, The University of
Chicago Law School.
1 See Jon Postel, Domain Name System Structure and Delegation *1 (Internet En-
gineering Task Force Network Working Group, Mar 1994) ("RFC 1591"), archived at
http://perma.cc/6HND-9UYN.
2 See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Root Zone Database, archived at
http://perma.cc/VM28-Q3XJ. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers (ICANN) distinguishes between two gTLD subtypes-unsponsored gTLDs (uTLDs)
and sponsored gTLDs (sTLDs)-based on whether the gTLD is intended to be used by a
wide community or narrow subcommunity, respectively. For more information on the
distinction between unsponsored and sponsored gTLDs, see Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers, Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), archived at
http://perma.cc/62HH-9MFE. ICANN also recognizes one infrastructure TLD: ".arpa."
See LANA, Root Zone Database (cited in note 2).
3 See Torsten Bettinger, ed, Domain Name Law and Practice: An International
Handbook 22-23 (Oxford 2005).
4 See id at 5.
5 See, for example, Stern v Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 WL 5858095, *3 (DDC
2014) (noting that "[t]here is little authority" on whether domain names may be attached
in satisfaction of a judgment).
1457
The University of Chicago Law Review
TLDs are eligible for trademark protection, while others are
not.6 Some TLDs can be alienated by their administrators, while
others cannot.7 Some TLDs can restrict registration of subdo-
mains, while others cannot. 8 With regard to the DNS more gen-
erally, some domains may be seized to satisfy claims or debts,
while others may not.9
This Comment attempts to unify case law, statutory law,
and extralegal norms into an overarching theory explaining the
property status of TLDs. Because transactions relating to TLDs
take place both inside and outside of formal legal frameworks,
an assessment of TLDs' property status must account for both
legal decisions relating to the DNS and extralegal events that
illuminate a community consensus on which property rights
should be recognized in TLDs. 1
Part I explains the technical background of the DNS and
provides a brief historical overview of major events implicating
TLD ownership. Part II considers cases and statutes relating to
domain names and TLDs and identifies two strains of judicial
interpretation. Specifically, courts have generally followed either
an abstract-property theory or a service theory in deciding
whether a given domain name is subject to transfer. Part III at-
tempts to reconcile this case law with extralegal practice, argu-
ing for an approach to TLDs that weighs four normative consid-
erations: stability, predictability, descriptive accuracy, and
respect for the interests of the Internet community at large. Ul-
timately, the best solution is to view TLDs as analogous to Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) wireless-spectrum li-
censes: TLD operators exercise some private rights while
ICANN retains the public right to regulate TLD policy. Viewing
TLDs as licenses balances the normative interests and pro-
vides an established body of law for formal adjudication of
TLD disputes.
6 See Part II.A.1.
7 See Part II.A.3.
s See Part II.B.2.
9 See Part II.A.2.
10 For a discussion of the interaction between legal and extralegal standards in
cyberlaw, see generally Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Cyber Law:
Norms, Property Rights, Contracting, Dispute Resolution and Enforcement without the
State, 1 J L Econ & Pol 269 (2005).
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I. BACKGROUND AND TECHNICAL OVERVIEW
Courts have not always grasped how domain names and
TLDs operate. As this Comment argues, one major failing in
TLD doctrine has been a lack of descriptive accuracy-in other
words, a mismatch between how legal doctrines describe TLDs
and how TLDs actually work. Addressing this issue requires an
understanding of the technical systems that underlie the DNS.
This Part first discusses the relevant aspects of the DNS's tech-
nical side. Then, to clarify the current organization of rights and
responsibilities relating to TLD management, this Part provides
a brief overview of the DNS's historical development.
A. The Internet DNS
Every website is located at an Internet-protocol (IP) ad-
dress-a long string of numbers that looks like "192.168.0.1".11
Because these numbers tend to be difficult to memorize, the
DNS translates between numerical IP addresses and their cor-
responding plain-text web addresses. The DNS distinguishes be-
tween TLDs (such as ".com" or ".au") and subdomains (a domain
that is part of a larger domain). Because each IP address can
correspond to only a single domain name, only one party can
provide the instructions that redirect an end user to a website
when the end user enters a particular domain name.12 In other
words, for the DNS to work, there can be only one "google.com"
and only one master list of which subdomains are registered un-
der ".com."
When a network device like a computer or cell phone wishes
to connect to a website-say, "calendar.google.com"-it makes a
11 This particular IP address is reserved for local addresses. Popular websites uti-
lize multiple IP addresses to handle the enormous amount of traffic they receive. Google,
for example, uses the IP ranges 63.233.160.0 to 64.233.191.255, 74.125.0.0 to
74.125.255.255, and 209.85.128.0 to 209.85.255.255, among others. The above are exam-
ples of IPv4 addresses; the newer IPv6 addresses look like
"2001:0cb8:85a4:0000:0000:8a3d:0460:7342"; they amply demonstrate why coordination
through the DNS is necessary. See Robert M. Hinden and Stephen E. Deering, IP Ver-
sion 6 Addressing Architecture *3-5 (Internet Engineering Task Force, Network Working
Group, July 1998), archived at http://perma.cc/4DX5.BCPB.
12 See P. Mockapetris, Domain Names - Implementation and Specification (Internet
Engineering Task Force Network Working Group, Nov 1987), archived at
http://perma.cc/L22X-7U9F. See also Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers, Beginner's Guide to Domain Names *3 (Dec 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/J7MM-DVT8.
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multistep query.13 First, the device must figure out where ".com"
is located; to answer this question, it needs to ask the root name
server. The root name server is a server (or, more accurately, a
system of servers) containing the definitive listing of the location
of every TLD within the DNS.14 Once the device learns from the
root name server where ".com" is located, it asks the ".com"
servers where "google.com" is located. Finally, when the device
knows where "google.com" is located, it asks the "google.com"
servers where "calendar.google.com" is located.15 While this pro-
cess is quite fast, it is actually the result of many servers in geo-
graphically distant locations operating sequentially.16 Im-
portantly, a TLD without a subdomain listed does not resolve
into an IP address-trying to visit ".com" is impossible.
If the root name servers disagree on how to resolve a partic-
ular query, the Internet may become fractured and requests for
a particular domain may return different results depending on
which network the requesting device is connected to. For exam-
ple, Internet users in Kansas might see a different "google.com"
than Internet users in Cancun-and, potentially, only one of
these might be Google's desired "google.com." Users of different
networks may still be able to communicate through other
methods-for example, through Twitter or an e-mail protocol-
but they will not be able to visit conflicting webpages on the
other network. This is known as "splitting the root," and com-
mentators consider this a disastrous outcome for the future of
13 For an overview of this process, see A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyber-
space: Using ICANN to Route around the APA and the Constitution, 50 Duke L J 17, 37-
42 (2000).
14 While this is how the DNS is structured, DNS resolution often works differently
in practice. Web-enabled devices have caches that store the addresses of popular web-
sites and name servers, enabling requests to be resolved more quickly. See Daniel
Karrenberg, DNS Root Name Servers Frequently Asked Questions (Internet Society, Feb
2008), archived at http://perma.cc/3UTR-CGWK. For a more detailed explanation, see
Roy Fielding, Mark Nottingham, and Julian Reschke, Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP/1.1); Caching *4-6 (Internet Engineering Task Force, June 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/N29W-MBD4.
15 The part of the domain name listed as "calendar" in this example is known as a
host name or leaf domain. See P. Mockapetris, Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities
*6-7 (Internet Engineering Task Force Network Working Group, Nov 1987), archived at
http://perma.cc/7V2J-PCJ3.
16 See Froomkin, 50 Duke L J at 21 n 7, 42-43 (cited in note 13). Some private enti-
ties operate alternate DNS processes. For example, Google operates its own DNS serv-
ers. See Public DNS (Google Developers, Mar 31, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/TD8P-PKY5. Networks that block sites-for example, airline wireless
networks that prohibit streaming services-sometimes do so by redirecting DNS queries
away from their intended targets to certain specified sites.
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the Internet: if the Internet's great success is due at least in
part to the free and unimpeded flow of information across peo-
ple, distances, and devices, a fractured web threatens this free-
dom by separating users of different networks.'" Splitting the
root also creates a serious externality problem for domain name
owners, whereas maintaining a single, unified root ensures that
any given domain name is accessible on any device in the
world.18
The root name servers remain unified by syncing to a file
called the root zone file, which contains the master list of every
TLD's location within the DNS.19 There are currently thirteen
root name servers, named A through M.20 Until 1987, however,
there were only four, all of which were located in the United
States; when the DNS was expanded to increase general per-
formance and decrease system load,21 the number of stateside
servers grew to ten, and three additional servers were intro-
duced outside the United States.22 Now, the root name servers
are decentralized among hundreds of physical server instances
but remain grouped within the A through M designations.23
The crucial aspect of the DNS for property purposes is that
each name server synchronizes its root zone file with the A
name server-a synchronization that is vitally important to
ensure a unified root. The A name server is currently operat-
ed by Verisign under contract with the US government. 24 The
17 See Wolfgang Kleinwachter, De-mystification of the Internet Root: Do We Need
Governmental Oversight?, in William J. Drake, ed, Reforming Internet Governance: Per-
spectives from the Working Group on Internet Governance 209, 224 (United Nations 2008):
The negative consequences of such fragmentation would be the end of the
ubiquity of the Internet in which everywhere everybody could communicate
every time with everybody. A system with diversified roots ... would reduce
Internet freedoms, choices and options . .. and would make it much easier for
restrictive Governments to control the virtual life of their citizens.
18 See Markus Miiller, Who Owns the Internet? Ownership as a Legal Basis for
American Control of the Internet, 15 Fordham Intel Prop, Media & Enter L J 709, 716
(2005). See also Milton L. Mueller, Competing DNS Roots: Creative Destruction or Just
Plain Destruction? *2-3 (Oct 2001), archived at http://perma.cc/TJM4-BRTU.
19 See Mueller, Competing DNS Roots at *3 (cited in note 18).
20 See Root-servers.org, archived at http://perma.cc/E6E6-WSXG.
21 Before 1987, mappings of host names to addresses were contained in a single text
file (hosts.txt). This resulted in significant bandwidth usage. See Mockapetris, Domain
Names at *1-2 (cited in note 15).
22 See Harold Feld, Structured to Fail: ICANN and the "Privatization" Experiment,
in Adam Thierer and Clyde Wayne Crews Jr, eds, Who Rules the Net? Internet Govern-
ance and Jurisdiction 333, 337 (Cato 2003). See also Root-servers.org (cited in note 20).
23 See Root-servers.org (cited in note 20).
24 See A.root-services.net (Verisign), archived at http://perma.cc/HE4Q-3T4H.
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operators of the B through M name servers work outside of the
direct control of any higher organization but nevertheless
acknowledge their responsibilities through agreements with the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and ICANN.25
Ownership of the root zone file is a high-stakes question.26
Whoever controls the root zone file can add or remove TLDs
within minutes and can designate the registry operator for each
TLD.27 Registration of subdomains generates millions of dollars
in revenue for the registrars each year, and a collection of sub-
domains under popular TLDs contains significant intellectual
property interests.28 Similarly, administration of TLDs can carry
significant policy implications: lax administrators provide a ha-
ven for malware sites, digital piracy, or trademark infringe-
ment.29 Although TLD ownership has rarely been contested in
US courts, the underlying property interests are valuable not
just for the registration revenue and intellectual property inter-
ests they impact but also for the multibillion-dollar e-commerce
industry they support.
25 See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Model MoU for Root
Nameserver Operations (Jan 21, 2002), archived at http://perma.cc/N5JR-7X3K. See also
Karrenberg, DNS Root Name Servers Frequently Asked Questions (cited in note 14).
26 See Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Bor-
derless World 30-32 (Oxford 2006) ("Not only does the domain name system affect valu-
able Internet-related property rights, it also has the potential to serve as a powerful tool
of Internet enforcement and to shape the nature of the Internet itself.").
27 A registry operator administers the zone file for a given TLD (sometimes referred
to as "the registry"), entering second-level domains as requested by registrars. See Inter-
net Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Glossary at "Registry", archived at
http://perma.cc/6X3M-55VT. As a result, a registry operator is ultimately responsible for
the addition or removal of a given subdomain and can change the operator of a given
subdomain as requested. See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers,
FAQ for Name Reservation, Allocation, and Reservation *1 (Aug 8, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/Q2Y3-GA4G. In practice, this addition and deletion can be managed by
accredited registrars, which are generally independent entities under contract with
ICANN. Sometimes, however, the registry operator may serve as a registrar as well. See
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Information for Registrars and
Registrants, archived at http://perma.cc/SAC2-HAGU.
28 For a discussion of the complexities surrounding virtual-property interests, see
generally David Nelmark, Virtual Property: The Challenges of Regulating Intangible, Ex-
clusionary Property Interests Such as Domain Names, 3 Nw J Tech & Intel Prop 1 (2004).
29 See Leigh Metcalf, A ccTLD Case Study: .tv (Carnegie Mellon University, July
12, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/6SRD-69SD.
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B. History of De Facto Ownership over the DNS
The Internet domain name system was originally designed
and operated by Jon Postel. 3o Postel proposed and implemented
many of the earliest gTLDs, such as ".com," ".edu," and ".net."31
By 1988, Postel's authority over the DNS was made official
through a contract between the Department of Defense (DOD)
and the Stanford Research Institute.32 While much early Inter-
net research was funded by the DOD and the National Science
Foundation in conjunction with research universities, the US
government was largely content to leave administrative policy
determinations (such as the organization and specification of the
DNS) to those with technical expertise; Postel's arrangement
was no exception.33 This contract also founded the IANA, which
was originally responsible for the allocation of the unique names
and numbers used by the DNS. This function-assigning blocks
of unique IP addresses to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs)
and administering the root name servers-is known as the
"IANA function."34
In 1990, as the result of defense-contract regulation, root
zone control-that is, control over the A name server, to which
the other root name servers synced the root zone file containing
the master list of TLDs-was transferred from the Stanford Re-
search Institute to Network Solutions, Inc (NSI).35 This transfer
sparked the first major battle for control of the DNS. The Inter-
net technical community, consisting mostly of the engineers and
computer scientists who created the web's infrastructure, gener-
ally believed that the DNS should rest in the hands of a non-
profit, nongovernmental entity serving the larger Internet
community.36 In their view, the Internet's growth from a lim-
ited network among US-based research universities to a global
phenomenon necessitated a governing structure more respon-
sive to international concerns and less swayed by US-specific
30 Postel retains mythical status among Internet historians for administering the
DNS in the early stages of the Internet and for serving as the primary manager of the
LANA function until his death in 1998, among other significant contributions. See
Goldsmith and Wu, Who Controls the Internet? at 33-36 (cited in note 26).
31 See id at 33.
32 See id at 35.
33 See id at 33.
34 See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, LANA Functions:
The Basics, archived at http://perma.ccIP52D-GPPX.
35 See Goldsmith and Wu, ho Controls the Internet? at 35 (cited in note 26).
36 See id at 35-38.
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interests-interests that community members believed were al-
ready jeopardizing the Internet's future growth, as evidenced by
NSI's handling of registry responsibilities.37 In 1997, these com-
munity members formed the Internet Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC)
and published a quasi manifesto known as the Generic Top-
Level Domain Memorandum of Understanding, outlining plans
to establish an independent governing group in Switzerland for
the DNS and the IANA function.38
While many in the Internet community supported the
IAHC's efforts, the US government took a different view. Much
of the early Internet infrastructure was developed as a result of
collaboration among research universities, the DOD, and the
National Science Foundation. 39 As such, the US government be-
lieved that it was ultimately best positioned to shepherd the
Internet's growth, balancing the competing pressures of "pre-
dictability and security" on the one hand and freedom from
"micro-regulations" on the other; for these reasons, the US gov-
ernment asserted that the DNS and the root zone file belonged
under US control.40 The United States' position was motivated
both by skepticism about the accountability of a privately held
Internet and by a desire to ensure the Internet's responsiveness
to the interests of "the U.S. government, [] foreign governments,
[and] business."41
As a challenge to US authority over the DNS, Postel di-
rected name servers not under NSI control to synchronize with
his B name server instead of NSI's A name server. 42 NSI still
maintained authority over the A name server, but, for a brief pe-
riod, eight of the other name servers synced their copies of the
37 See Heather N. Mewes, Memorandum of Understanding on the Generic Top-
Level Domain Name Space of the Internet Domain Name System, 13 Berkeley Tech L J
235, 238-39 (1998).
38 The Internet Community, Establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding on
the Generic Top Level Domain Name Space of the Internet Domain Name System (gTLD-
MoU) (International Telecommunication Union, Feb 28, 1997), archived at
http://perma.cc/MW2N-S4TD.
39 See Scott J. Shackelford and Amanda N. Craig, Beyond the New "Digital Divide"
Analyzing the Evolving Role of National Governments in Internet Governance and En-
hancing Cybersecurity, 50 Stan J Intl L 119, 125-26 (2014).
40 Goldsmith and Wu, %%o Controls the Internet? at 40-43 (cited in note 26) (quota-
tion marks omitted).
41 Id at 42.
42 Id at 43-46. The actual legal status of Postel's move was questionable, but as
Postel was the father of the system, the name-server operators deferred to him. As one
name-server operator described: "If Jon asks us ... we'll do it. He is the authority here."
Id at 44.
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root zone file with Postel's B name server instead.43 Postel's
move threatened to split the root: if he had decided to change
anything in the root zone file, users connected to the nine name
servers under his control would see different DNS-query results
than users connected to the three name servers that remained
with NSI. The move was more symbolic than threatening, given
that Postel's B name server continued to sync with NSI's A
name server. But the implications were clear. The Clinton ad-
ministration threatened Postel, demanding that he reverse the
changes and resume synchronizing the name servers with NSI's
root zone file on the A name server. 44 Postel complied. The US
government had successfully claimed control of the DNS.45
The US government's move was not viewed favorably in
the Internet technical community. Misgivings about DNS con-
trol resting in government hands were widespread; further-
more, the United States' designated administrator, NSI, drew
heavy criticism for abusing its artificial monopoly to the det-
riment of the Internet community. 46 In response to these criti-
cisms and to an antitrust suit from a would-be competing TLD
registrar,47 the United States proposed to privatize the IANA
function by transferring DNS control to an independent non-
profit to be incorporated under US law and involving interna-
tional participation.48 Despite concerns, the privatization
43 See id at 44-45. At this time, the name-server operators operated voluntarily
and could thus make these changes without running afoul of any contractual obligations.
Today, name-server operators recognize an obligation to provide this service. See
Karrenberg, DNS Root Name Servers Frequently Asked Questions (cited in note 14).
44 See Goldsmith and Wu, Who Controls the Internet? at 45-46 (cited in note 26).
45 See id.
46 See Feld, Structured to Fail at 341-42 (cited in note 22). NSI was the first bene-
ficiary of the US government's attempt to privatize DNS functions. For a detailed history
of NSI's role and the criticisms of its management of the DNS, see Daniel J. Par6, Inter-
net Governance in Transition: Who Is the Master of This Domain? 19-23 (Rowman & Lit-
tlefield 2002).
47 See PGMedia, Inc v Network Solutions, Inc, 51 F Supp 2d 389, 395 (SDNY 1999)
(alleging antitrust violations against NSI as the sole provider of Internet domain name
registration services).
48 See Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses,
63 Fed Reg 8826, 8827-28 (1998) ("We propose the creation of a private, not-for-profit
corporation (the new corporation) to manage the coordinated functions in a stable and
open institutional framework. The new corporation should operate as a private entity for
the benefit of the Internet as a whole.").
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proposal was finalized in 1998,49 and within months ICANN
was formed.50
The US government 5' agreed to transfer administration of
the DNS and the IANA function to ICANN shortly thereafter.52
ICANN manages both the technical and policy components of
the DNS today. 53 ICANN does not actually own the root zone
file; any changes to TLD registrars or the addition or deletion of
any TLDs must instead be approved by the Department of
Commerce. 54 However, the Department of Commerce does not
initiate changes to the root zone file and generally does not deny
any changes requested by ICANN.55
Two recent developments are important to resolving the
question whether TLDs manifest property rights. First, ICANN
has added more than one hundred new TLDs within the last
decade.56 These additions fall into two broad categories. The first
category contains non-Latin ccTLDs for countries like Russia,
Saudi Arabia, and Japan to resolve Cyrillic, Arabic, and other
non-Latin domain names into IP addresses. 57 The other category
includes sponsored gTLDs, which are operated by private enti-
ties under contract with ICANN, including such new TLDs as
49 See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed Reg 31741, 31751
(1998) ("White Paper").
50 IANA is now a department within ICANN. See Internet Assigned Names Author-
ity, Introducing LANA, archived at http:/lperma.cc/SWG9-GUM3.
51 While early Internet research was conducted through contracts between the
DOD, the National Science Foundation, and research universities, by the late 1990s the
Department of Commerce's National Telecommunication and Information Administra-
tion (NTIA) took over primary responsibility for DNS regulatory issues. See National
Research Council, Signposts in Cyberspace: The Domain Name System and Internet Nav-
igation 76-77 (National Academies 2005).
52 See Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Department of Commerce
and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (Nov 25, 1998), archived at
http://perma.cc/76K4-WXMW.
53 See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, What Does ICANN
Do?, archived at http://perma.cc/4GWH-8JQE.
54 See Cyrus Farivar, ICANN to Plaintiffs: No, You Can't Have All of Iran's Do-
mains (Ars Technica, July 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/86W6-PN7Q.
55 See Feld, Structured to Fail at 347 (cited in note 22). One notable exception is
the ".xxx" domain debacle, in which the US government was accused of interfering in
ICANN negotiations with ICM, the prospective ".xxx" gTLD registry operator. See, for
example, Scott P. Sonbuchner, Note, Master of Your Domain: Should the U.S. Govern-
ment Maintain Control over the Internet's Root?, 17 Minn J Intl L 183, 200 (2008).
56 See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Largest Domain
Name Expansion in Internet's History Reaches Benchmark (Jan 21, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/L625-RGLT.
57 See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Internationalized
Domain Names, archived at http://perma.cc/8EDZ-AXTF.
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".yachts," ".republican," and ".hamburg. ' 8 The second major de-
velopment is that the Department of Commerce has announced
that it plans to relinquish control over the root zone file. 59
ICANN is currently drafting a transfer proposal; it is not yet
clear whether ICANN will propose to take over that controlling
role itself.60
These two trends call the legal framework surrounding
TLDs into question, and courts have begun to face more ques-
tions as to whether TLDs retain aspects of property. Some estab-
lished legal postures-such as unquestioned US control over the
DNS and the broad, generic character of the older gTLDs-no
longer seem certain. Given the importance of a unified, stable
DNS to a global economy that increasingly relies on the free ex-
change of information via the Internet, resolution of the legal
entitlements involving TLDs has become critical.
II. Two THEORIES OF TLDS: ABSTRACT PROPERTY OR SERVICE?
Courts have struggled when faced with the question
whether a given domain name or TLD carries recognizable
property rights. Different areas of law point in different direc-
tions. Trademark cases have long recognized intellectual proper-
ty interests in subdomains and have recently indicated a will-
ingness to grant the same to TLDs, but courts have not
58 See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Delegated Strings
(2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9NBL-2BUK.
59 See National Telecommunications and Information Administration, NTIA An-
nounces Intent to Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions (Mar 14, 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/GT22-BT28. However, Congress has attempted to block the
NTIA from transitioning the IANA functions outside of US-government control. See Con-
solidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 § 540(a), Pub L No 113-235,
128 Stat 2130, 2217 (2014):
None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to relinquish the re-
sponsibility of the National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion during fiscal year 2015 with respect to Internet domain name system func-
tions, including responsibility with respect to the authoritative root zone file
and the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority functions.
The NTIA, for its part, remains committed to the transition. See Remarks by Assistant
Secretary Strickling at the State of the Net Conference (National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, Jan 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3NZA-PDQU.
6o The United States General Accounting Office has questioned whether the De-
partment of Commerce can give away root zone control. See Robert P. Murphy, Depart-
ment of Commerce: Relationship with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers *2 (United States General Accounting Office, July 7, 2000), archived at
http://perma.cc/AD73-7YV5. See also Milton L. Mueller, Ruling the Root: Internet Gov-
ernance and the Taming of Cyberspace 197 (MIT 2002).
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articulated a settled principle. Cases involving asset seizure-
either in the context of tort cases, contractual liability, or civil
forfeiture for criminal copyright violations-have taken diver-
gent approaches. Finally, a recent case involving attachment of
a ccTLD to satisfy tort liability points to an interesting but ulti-
mately unsatisfactory solution.
Two distinctions must be made at the outset. The first is be-
tween subdomains and TLDs. Commentators and courts have
sometimes neglected to recognize that these are separate con-
cepts. Second, and similarly, ccTLDs and gTLDs operate in basi-
cally identical fashions but implicate different sets of concerns:
ccTLDs raise questions of sovereignty and international law,61
while gTLDs are more markedly commercial in nature. 62 Wheth-
er these distinctions call for recognition of correspondingly dis-
tinct legal rights is a separate question.
While remaining mindful of the differences between subdo-
mains and TLDs, this Part examines case law, statutes, and ex-
tralegal events relevant to the question of TLDs' property sta-
tus. There are two main trends moving in opposite directions.
On the one hand, increasing recognition of property interests in
subdomains-such as that which appears in trademark-is be-
ginning to filter over to views on TLDs. On the other hand, com-
parisons of subdomains to nonproperty concepts like street ad-
dresses or telephone numbers have gained a foothold in the
realm of bankruptcy and attachment. Neither the pro-property
view nor the anti-property view can count a decisive victory yet,
but each view garners substantial support from different facets
of the law.
A. TLDs Recognized as Property
Over the past few years, US law has seen a "movement to-
wards treating a domain name as simple property, susceptible to
seizure and usable as a source of in rem jurisdiction.63 This
shift has taken place almost entirely with subdomains, rather
61 See generally Kim G. von Arx and Gregory R. Hagen, Sovereign Domains: A Dec-
laration of Independence of ccTLDs from Foreign Control, 9 Richmond J L & Tech 4 (2002).
62 See Joseph P. Smith III, The Tangled Web: A Case against New Generic Top-
Level Domains, 20 Richmond J L & Tech 1, 14 (2014) (noting ICANN's justification for
new gTLDs as a "business opportunity" for registrars) (quotation marks omitted).
63 Jack Mellyn, 'Reach Out and Touch Someone" The Growing Use of Domain
Name Seizure as a Vehicle for the Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S. Law, 42
Georgetown J Intl L 1241, 1247 (2011).
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than TLDs; only one case has raised the question whether a
TLD can be seized.64 Nevertheless, insights developed in the
law of subdomains may prove useful for answering the question
whether TLDs contain property rights. Subdomains and TLDs
share significant technical similarities, despite the differences in
their uses; legal doctrine that is applicable to one, then, may re-
flect principles relevant to the other. At the same time, given
these differences, the wisest path may involve some separation
between the two doctrines when the legal question more directly
touches a unique aspect of subdomains or TLDs-for example,
the fact that subdomains point an end user to a specific
webpage, while TLDs are often more valuable as collections of
registered subdomains. Subdomain cases, then, can be helpful,
but they should be evaluated critically before being directly ap-
plied to the realm of TLDs. This Section identifies three theories
in favor of a view of TLDs as property, some more heavily
grounded in the law of subdomains than others.
1. Trademark protection for TLDs.
Courts have long recognized trademark protection in sub-
domains. In the early days of the Internet, cybersquatters regis-
tered trademarks of large corporations as web addresses and at-
tempted to sell these domains back to the trademark owners at
a premium; some companies paid the cybersquatters' bounties,
while others brought actions against cybersquatters.65 Two of
the earliest decisions to address the question whether cyber-
squatters could face liability under the Lanham Act66 for regis-
tering trademarks as webpages were decided in favor of trade-
mark protection.67 Later courts have followed suit.68
64 See Stern v Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 WL 5858095, *3 (DDC 2014). See also
Part II.B.2.
65 See P. Wayne Hale, Note, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act &
Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 16 Berkeley Tech L J 205, 206-07 (2001).
66 Pub L No 79-489, 60 Stat 427 (1946), codified at 15 USC § 1051 et seq.
67 See Panavision International, LP v Toeppen, 141 F3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir 1998);
Intermatic, Inc v Toeppen, 947 F Supp 1227, 1241 (ND Ill 1996). Both of these cases were
brought against the same cybersquatter defendant. See Panavision International, 141
F3d at 1318; Intermatic, 947 F Supp at 1228.
68 See, for example, E & J Gallo Winery v Spider Webs Ltd, 286 F3d 270, 277 (5th
Cir 2002); Sporty's Farm LLC v Sportsman's Market, Inc, 202 F3d 489, 499 (2d Cir 2000).
The adoption of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (known as the ACPA
and discussed at greater length in Part II.A.2) and the introduction of ICANN's arbi-
tration procedures (known as the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Process,
or UDRP) have introduced alternate routes for plaintiffs seeking protection against
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Although trademark protection for subdomains is settled, a
remaining question involves the extent to which subdomains
have property characteristics independent of the intellectual
property interests reflected therein. One way to resolve this is
by looking toward remedies. The question of remedies remains
open, and the types of remedies available largely depend on
theories of the underlying property nature of domain names.
Plaintiffs have sought a variety of remedies against both cyber-
squatters and others holding domain names that violate recog-
nized trademarks.69 For example, in Brookfield Communications,
Inc v West Coast Entertainment Corp,70 Brookfield sought and
was granted an injunction that barred West Coast from using
Brookfield's trademark in the domain name "moviebuff.com."71
In other cases, plaintiffs have successfully forced the transfer of
domain names from particularly egregious cybersquatters.72 The
fact that domain names may be transferable in cases of trade-
mark violation is an important data point in answering the
question of which property rights should be recognized in TLDs,
and it implies a theory of domain names' property status that
extends beyond trademark dilution.
Trademark protection did not traditionally extend to TLDs,
but ICANN's expansion of the gTLD namespace has changed
this picture. In Image Online Design, Inc v Core Association73
the plaintiff, Image Online Design, sought injunctive and mone-
tary relief against a would-be competing registrar on the
grounds that it held common-law trademark rights in the ".web"
gTLD.74 The ".web" gTLD was not in operation at the time7 but
cybersquatters. Additionally, as more plaintiffs opt for UDRP, litigation over cyber-
squatting appears to have decreased relative to UDRP claims. See Jordan A. Arnot, Nav-
igating Cybersquatting Enforcement in the Expanding Internet, 13 John Marshall Rev
Intel Prop L 321, 327 (2014).
69 Not all holders of domain names that violate trademarks do so in an attempt to
cybersquat. See, for example, Mattel v Barbie-Club.com, 310 F3d 293, 299 (2d Cir 2002)
(involving a lawsuit by Mattel alleging that an Australian barbeque company was dilut-
ing Mattel's trademarks by operating the "captainbarbie.com" subdomain).
70 174 F3d 1036 (9th Cir 1999).
71 Id at 1066-67.
72 See, for example, Virtual Works, Inc v Volkswagen of America, Inc, 238 F3d 264,
271 (4th Cir 2001). A transfer is authorized only if the plaintiffs succeed in proving their
infringement claim under a heightened standard imposed by the ACPA. See 15 USC
§ 1125(d)(1)(a)(i) (requiring bad faith as a prerequisite for trademark liability under the
ACPA). See also Part II.A.2 (discussing the ACPA in greater detail).
73 120 F Supp 2d 870 (CD Cal 2000).
74 Id at 872.
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the defendant was selling ".web" subdomains to customers under
the presumption that ICANN would eventually approve the
".web" gTLD. The court ruled against Image Online Design's
claim on the grounds that ".web" was a generic mark that did
not indicate source.76 Because customers can obtain registra-
tion of a subdomain under many registrars, the Court rea-
soned, a particular TLD does not point to any one registrar as
its "owner."77 From this case, it initially appeared that both the
extensive trademark protections applicable to subdomains-and
with them, an implication of property-would not extend to
TLDs.
However, a recent opinion by the Trademark Trial and Ap-
peal Board (TTAB), an adjudicative body inside the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), has recognized that
after ICANN's decision to expand the TLD namespace, TLDs
may serve a source-identifying function. In In re theDot Com-
munications Network LLC,78 the TTAB held that the ".music"
gTLD was ineligible for trademark protection because it was
"merely descriptive."79 But importantly, the TTAB noted as an
example in its decision that Canon, Inc planned to seek trade-
mark protection for a potential ".canon" gTLD, and the TTAB
indicated that ".canon" might be eligible for protections 0 The
implication of the TTAB's discussion is clear: certain sponsored
gTLDs could be eligible for trademark protection if they meet
the Lanham Act's requirements.81
At least one court has recognized the impact of the TTAB's
dicta. In 2013, Image Online Design again attempted to gain
recognition for its ".web" trademark-this time, by bringing an
action against ICANN alleging that ICANN's plan to grant reg-
istry control of ".web" to competing applicants would violate
Image Online Design's ".web" trademark and breach a contract
75 The ".web" TLD remains unused. See IANA, Root Zone Database (cited in
note 2).
76 Image Online Design, 120 F Supp 2d at 876. By implication, this holding in-
cluded all then-existing TLDs because the only TLDs existing at the time were those in-
cluded in the original group of gTLDs designated by LANA plus the ccTLDs.
77 Id.
78 101 USPQ2d 1062 (TTAB 2011).
79 Id at 1068-69.
80 Id at 1067 n 22.
81 For these requirements, see 15 USC § 1052(e).
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between Image Online Design and ICANN.82 While the court
again ruled against Image Online Design, it noted:
[Ilf ICANN were to introduce the TLD .APPLE, the user
would arguably expect that that TLD is administered by
Apple Inc. In such a case, the TLD might be considered a
source indicator. If Sony tried to administer the TLD
.APPLE, Apple Inc. would likely argue and possibly prevail
on a trademark infringement claim.83
No case has subsequently arisen in which a plaintiff has
successfully asserted trademark infringement against a TLD
registry operator for its use of the TLD. But the expansion of the
TLD namespace is very recent, and it might generally be ex-
pected that, given major brands' experiences with cybersquat-
ters in the late 1990s and early 2000s, companies will register
any potentially infringing TLDs.84 Further, in 2013 the PTO took
another step by initiating a change to its examination guide to
allow for trademark protection of gTLDs.85 The traditional posi-
tion that TLDs cannot be trademarked has been called into
question with the introduction of "brand" gTLDs like ".canon."
2. Operation in Our Sites and the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act.
Mirroring the increasing trend in trademark law to recog-
nize property protection for subdomains and TLDs, two federal
statutory schemes support a view of domain names as property.
The first-the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for In-
tellectual Property Act of 200886 (PRO-IP Act)-expands federal
jurisdiction over domain names by providing for civil forfeiture
proceedings in cases of intellectual property crimes.87 Interest-
ingly, these crimes need not have any connection with the do-
main name itself; rather, the statutes are directed toward
82 See Image Online Design, Inc v Internet Corp for Assigned Names and Numbers,
2013 WL 489899, *2-5 (CD Cal).
83 Id at *8.
84 For example, in March 2015, ".Nissan," ".Datsun," "Oracle," ". Infiniti," and
".Epson" were added as sponsored gTLDs. See Delegated Strings (cited in note 58).
85 See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Share Comments/Suggestions
on Draft of Examination Guide: Applications for Marks Comprised of gTLDs for Domain
Name Registration or Registry Services (Sept 10, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/3JZW-RY79.
86 Pub L No 110-403, 122 Stat 4256.
87 15 USC § 2323(a)(2).
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practices like media piracy, regardless of whether the domain
name itself implicates a protected trademark. The second statu-
tory scheme-the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act8
(ACPA)-largely codifies the trademark protections for subdo-
mains outlined above, but with one important addition: domain
names are subject to in rem jurisdiction wherever the domain
name registrar or registry is located. These two statutory models
provide additional support for a property rights-oriented view of
domain names, over and above the support recognized by
trademark law.
In 2010, the US government initiated Operation in Our
Sites, an enforcement program targeted at websites that illegal-
ly host and distribute counterfeit and pirated content.8 9 The cre-
ation of Operation in Our Sites is authorized by the PRO-IP Act,
which provides for the civil forfeiture or destruction of any prop-
erty used to commit or facilitate certain enumerated intellectual
property crimes.90 To initiate seizure of a domain name, Immi-
grations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents investigate the
website in question and then present affidavits to a magistrate.
If the magistrate finds probable cause, she can grant a seizure
order.91 This order is presented to the domain name registry lo-
cated in the United States, and a banner stating that ICE has
seized the domain is inserted to replace all content previously on
the website.92 ICE seizures have been heavily criticized in the
Internet community, with allegations of due process violations
(since seizures proceed ex parte), First Amendment violations,
and improper lobbying of ICE by the Recording Industry Associ-
ation of America, an interest group for music copyright holders.93
Importantly, the PRO-IP Act does not explicitly provide that
domain names are property subject to seizure. The relevant text
of the civil forfeiture statute states that "[a]ny property used, or
intended to be used, in any manner or part to commit or facili-
tate the commission of' certain specified offenses is subject to
88 Pub L No 106-113, 113 Stat 1501A-545 (1999).
89 See United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Operation in Our
Sites (May 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.ccU2FU-YRQM. See also Karen Kopel,
Operation Seizing Our Sites: How the Federal Government Is Taking Domain Names
without Prior Notice, 28 Berkeley Tech L J 859, 860-61 (2013).
90 18 USC § 2323.
91 See Kopel, 28 Berkeley Tech L J at 865 (cited in note 89).
92 For further explanation of the seizure process, see id at 874-77.
93 See, for example, id at 885-93.
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seizure. 94 The DOJ and ICE have interpreted § 2323 to include
domain names as property,95 and given the continued practice of
domain name seizure under Operation in Our Sites, it appears
that a number of federal magistrate judges have agreed with
this interpretation.96
One other statutory scheme authorizes the seizure and
transfer of domain names. In 1999, Congress passed the ACPA
to target cybersquatters who opportunistically register infring-
ing domain names. The ACPA is more explicit than the PRO-IP
Act regarding domain names' property status, referring directly
to "domain names" rather than merely to "property. 97 Further,
the ACPA defines domain names as property for the purpose of
in rem jurisdiction: if the plaintiff is unable to obtain in perso-
nam jurisdiction over the owner of the domain name, he may sue
the owner of the domain name in whichever district the domain
name registry or registrar is located.9s The ACPA sends a clear
message that if domain names infringe on registered trade-
marks, the domain name can be seized in a manner that is con-
sistent with traditional notions of property law.99
94 18 USC § 2323(a)(1)(B).
95 See Brian T. Yeh, Online Copyright Infringement and Counterfeiting: Legislation
in the 112th Congress *4 (Congressional Research Service, Dec 5, 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/7LKJ-W2SM.
96 These court orders are sealed. However, as noted above, when either the DOJ or
ICE wishes to seize a domain name, the agency is statutorily required to seek the au-
thorization of a magistrate. Thus, the continued existence of Operation in Our Sites
demonstrates near-universal compliance with these requests on the part of federal mag-
istrates. See, for example, US Department of Justice, Department of Justice Seizes More
than $1.5 Million in Proceeds from the Online Sale of Counterfeit Sports Apparel Manu-
factured in China (May 11, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/77T8-GVWV. Since the
inception of Operation in Our Sites in 2010, the DOJ and ICE have seized at least 2,713
domain names. See United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Federal
Agencies Seize More than $21.6 Million in Fake NFL Merchandise during 'Operation
Team Player' (Jan 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5RAC-L5G8. Only a handful of
websites have successfully opposed seizure. See In the Matter of the Seizure of the Inter-
net Domain Name "DAJAZ1.COM" (Electronic Frontier Foundation), archived at
http://perma.cc/EFM2-WD84; Mike Masnick, Oops: After Seizing & Censoring Rojadirec-
ta for 18 Months, Feds Give Up & Drop Case (Techdirt, Aug 29, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/EZ5W-D786.
97 Compare 15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii)(C) ("[A] court may order the forfeiture or
cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the
mark."), with. 18 USC § 2323(a)(1) ('The following property is subject to forfeiture to the
United States Government: ... (B) [a]ny property used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part to commit or facilitate the commission of an offense.").
98 15 USC § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
99 Courts have also authorized seizure of domain names under state statutes. See,
for example, Kentucky v 141 Internet Domain Names, 2008 WL 5261775, *39-40 (Ky Cir).
2015] A Stern Look at the Property Status of Top-Level Domains 1475
For example, in Office Depot, Inc v Zuccarini,1°° the Ninth
Circuit viewed the ACPA as persuasive authority for the propo-
sition that domain names are seizable property.101 Office Depot
obtained a judgment against the defendant for cybersquatting
under the ACPA but was unable to collect and instead assigned
the judgment to DS Holdings.102 DS Holdings then attempted to
collect other, noninfringing domain names from Zuccarini. Even
though these domain names were unrelated to any action under
the ACPA, the court nevertheless held that "the statute is au-
thority for the proposition that domain names are personal
property" subject to in rem jurisdiction wherever the registry or
registrar is located.103 Viewed this way, the ACPA supports a
concept of in rem jurisdiction based on domain names even when
those domain names are not used for cybersquatting or other-
wise subject to the provisions of the ACPA.
3. Kremen v Cohen:lo4 the "intangible property" theory.
Perhaps the strongest theory of domain names as property
is articulated in Kremen. Gary Kremen registered the subdo-
main "sex.com," but Stephen Cohen impersonated him in order
to convince the domain name registrar to release Kremen's reg-
istration; Cohen then registered the subdomain himself and
turned "sex.com" into a "lucrative online porn empire."105
Kremen ultimately prevailed on a conversion claim: Cohen had
deprived him of a property interest that he held in the domain
name.
106
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that domain names are intangi-
ble property on two grounds. First, "[o]wnership [of a domain
name] is exclusive in that the registrant alone" decides where
users who type in the domain name are sent.107 This characteris-
tic is similar to the rights of use and exclusion in the traditional
bundle of property rights:108 a registrant exercises the right to
use by deciding what visitors to a web address see and in turn
100 596 F3d 696 (9th Cir 2010).
101 Id at 702.
102 Id at 698.
103 Id at 702.
104 337 F3d 1024 (9th Cir 2003).
105 Id at 1027.
106 Id at 1036.
107 Id at 1030.
108 See J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L Rev 711,
756 (1996).
The University of Chicago Law Review
excluding others from making this decision. Second, "like other
forms of property, domain names are valued, bought and sold,
often for millions of dollars."109 In other words, domain names
are alienable. The right to alienate has long been viewed as one
of the fundamental rights associated with property. 110 To the ex-
tent that the law recognizes intangible property rights,"' a "do-
main name falls easily within this class of property."112
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Kremen is especially im-
portant to the question of property rights in TLDs because its
identification of a domain name as property did not rest on
trademark grounds or on a view that a webpage itself is a prop-
erty object. Instead, the court viewed a domain name as a "doc-
ument" or collection of documents in the DNS:
The DNS also bears some relation to Kremen's domain
name. We need not delve too far into the mechanics of the
Internet to resolve this case. It is sufficient to observe that
information correlating Kremen's domain name with a par-
ticular computer on the Internet must exist somewhere in
some form in the DNS; if it did not, the database would not
serve its intended purpose. Change the information in the
DNS, and you change the website people see when they type
"www.sex.com.""l3
Recognizing a property interest in what essentially amounts to a
line of text in a name server is fundamentally different from rec-
ognizing a property interest in a trademark. Unlike a trade-
mark, the protected item need not be "unique" or more than
"merely descriptive," 114 but rather it must simply be something
that provides one party exclusivity and control over what is
shown to a web address's visitors. Kremen should be properly
109 Kremen, 337 F3d at 1030.
110 See A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in A.G. Guest, ed, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence
107, 118 (Oxford 1961).
111 As distinct from tangible property-such as cars, houses, and other objects
falling into the categories of real or personal property-intangible property is generally
something over which one can have or transfer control but that does not have a physical
presence. Some examples include intellectual property rights (such as patents), stock
certificates, and bonds. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 242; Juliet M. Moringiello,
Seizing Domain Names to Enforce Judgments: Looking Back to Look to the Future, 72 U
Cin L Rev 95, 124-26 (2003); Courtney W. Franks, Comment, Analyzing the Urge to
Merge: Conversion of Intangible Property and the Merger Doctrine in the Wake of Kremen
v. Cohen, 42 Houston L Rev 489, 502-07 (2005).
112 Kremen, 337 F3d at 1033.
113 Id at 1034.
114 See text accompanying note 82.
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considered as setting forth a distinct theory of property interests
in domain names, and it may be the strongest case yet for recog-
nition of property interests in TLDs.
Ultimately, then, two broad doctrines support the idea that
TLDs could be property. The first, a trademark theory, is rela-
tively straightforward: if TLDs can be source identifying rather
than merely descriptive, they can receive certain protections un-
der that doctrine. The second view, that TLDs could be abstract
property, is more complex but also more robust. Under this ap-
proach, the line of text on a server that either a subdomain or a
TLD represents-a line of text in the TLD zone file in the case of
a subdomain, or a line of text in the root zone file in the case of a
TLD--constitutes intangible property similar to a stock certifi-
cate. In other words, the rights conveyed are the res, the thing
itself, and because these rights potentially include the rights to
exclude and alienate, they can be construed as property rights.
Nevertheless, the view that treats TLDs as property is not the
only view out there. As the next Section demonstrates, an ap-
proach treating domain names as services rather than property
has emerged to counter the property-oriented approaches de-
scribed above.
B. TLDs Recognized as Services
The second major line of cases views domain names as ser-
vices that, by definition, cannot be seized to satisfy tort or con-
tract judgments. It is useful at this point to reiterate the distinc-
tion between subdomains and TLDs: while a subdomain points
to a unique IP address, a TLD does not. A TLD may contain IP
addresses from many different blocks and cannot be separated
from the subdomains under it. The service theory of domain
names does not always reflect this distinction. But the strongest
version of the service theory would rely on the difference be-
tween a domain name pointing to a specific webpage and a TLD
aggregating a collection of subdomains. The service theory
would use this distinction to support the argument that, even if
domain names resemble abstract property-as Kremen and the
other doctrines above would hold-TLDs are more accurately
viewed as interconnected service agreements rather than dis-
crete property objects.
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1. Lockheed Martin Corp v Network Solutions, Incls and
Network Solutions, Inc v Umbro International, Inc:116 the
service theory.
In Lockheed, Lockheed brought an action against NSI for
contributory infringement due to NSI's role in providing domain
names to various parties who had registered domain names sim-
ilar to Lockheed's "Skunk Works" trademark."11 The registrants
of the various infringing domain names were numerous and dif-
ficult to locate.118 Lockheed's strategy of seeking injunctive relief
against NSI, the relevant DNS-registry operator, raised inter-
esting questions of third-party liability for cybersquatting and
Internet trademark violations. 119 Ultimately, the court deter-
mined that NSI provided a service-rather than a product-to
the registrants of infringing trademarks and therefore could not
be liable for contributory infringement.120 The court analogized
domain names to street addresses, explaining:
NSI's role differs little from that of the United States Postal
Service: when an Internet user enters a domain-name com-
bination, NSI translates the domain-name combination to
the registrant's IP Address and routes the information or
command to the corresponding computer.... NSI does not
supply the domain-name combination any more than the
Postal Service supplies a street address by performing the
routine service of routing mail.121
The product/service distinction does not directly map onto
the property/nonproperty question.122 Nevertheless, the two
115 194 F3d 980 (9th Cir 1999).
116 529 SE2d 80 (Va 2000).
117 Lockheed, 194 F3d at 983.
118 Id.
119 Lockheed also did not have the benefit of the ACPA, which was passed later that
year. See note 88 and accompanying text.
120 Lockheed, 194 F3d at 984-85.
121 Id (emphasis added).
122 One intuitively appealing approach might be to make a direct comparison be-
tween product and property on the one hand, and service and nonproperty on the other.
But it is important to keep in mind the context of the Lockheed decision. The domain
name in Lockheed comports with a product/service distinction that constitutes a term of
art within the doctrine of contributory infringement. See Inwood Laboratories, Inc v Ives
Laboratories, 456 US 844, 854 (1982):
Thus, if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe
a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or
has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer
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characterizations are conceptually similar, and the metaphor of
domain names as street addresses has proven influential and
long lasting in the broader debates over domain name law.123 Of
course, street addresses correspond to real property far more
concretely. Despite such points of discord, however, the concep-
tual similarity feels intuitive, and it might appeal to courts giv-
en the scarcity of domain name cases.
A similar service theory of domain names was articulated in
Umbro, in which the plaintiff, Umbro, had obtained a default
judgment against a Canadian corporation in a previous action.124
Umbro sought to enforce the judgment in Virginia state court by
garnishing the Canadian corporation's portfolio of valuable
domain names and naming NSI as the garnishee.125 NSI ar-
gued that it held no property of the judgment debtor, and it
characterized domain names as "standardized, executory ser-
vice contracts."126
The Virginia Supreme Court agreed with NSI, holding that
the domain names were not garnishable property. 127 In doing so,
the court analyzed the DNS in detail. The court considered the
ACPA's recent classification of domain names as property, and it
acknowledged the possibility that domain names may be a form
of intangible personal property. 128 But what proved most persua-
sive to the court was the analogy employed in Lockheed: the
court "[was] cognizant of the similarities between a telephone
number and an Internet domain name and consider[ed] both to
be products of contracts for services. ... [N]either one exists
separate from its respective service that created it."129
The Umbro decision should not be read broadly. The holding
rests on a narrow issue of Virginia law: the contract for services
between NSI and the Canadian corporation was determined not
to be a "liability" under one particular statutory provision. 130
or distributor is contributorially responsible for any harm done as a result of
the deceit.
Whether the product/service distinction in this area of law is completely coextensive with
other conceptions of property/nonproperty is a larger question.
123 See, for example, text accompanying note 149.
124 Umbro, 529 SE2d at 81.
125 One of these domain names was "umbro.com"; it appears that the Canadian cor-
poration in question was engaged in cybersquatting. Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Umbro, 529 SE2d at 86.
129 Id at 87.
130 Id at 86,
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Additionally, the court explicitly declined to decide whether do-
main names are a form of intellectual or intangible property, de-
spite NSI's concession that "the right to use a domain name is a
form of intangible personal property."131 The Umbro holding, in-
asmuch as it seems to reject the abstract-property view of do-
main names advanced by Kremen, does so within the bounds of a
specific state statutory scheme.
Nevertheless, the conceptualization of domain names as
services rather than property objects stands as a powerful
counterexample to the trademark protections implied by In re
theDot,132 the civil forfeiture implications of the ACPA and the
PRO-IP Act,133 and the abstract-property theory developed in
Kremen.134 Although the service theory has limitations in the
context of subdomains-for example, Lockheed likely would
have won under the ACPA, and Umbro relies on a specific set of
statutes underlying Virginia creditor-debtor law-those limita-
tions seem less salient in the context of TLDs. Even if subdo-
mains contain property rights (a stance powerfully expressed in
Kremen), some of those rights are much less apparent for TLDs,
which do not point to a particular, unique website. In other
words, if subdomains are appropriately treated as abstract prop-
erty at least in part because of the right to use, then the argu-
ment for treating TLDs under the same framework is murky:
the "use" of a TLD is primarily the registration of subdomains
happening under it. This is much less exclusionary than the
concept of using a subdomain, which by its nature within the
DNS can belong only to one party.
2. Stern v Islamic Republic of Iran:135 a challenge.
The case posing the greatest challenge to the property sta-
tus of TLDs is Stern. In 2003, Shaul Stern and his coplaintiffs
obtained a $109 million default judgment against Iran, Syria,
and North Korea stemming from the three countries' alleged
131 Id. The Umbro court "[did] not believe that it is essential to the outcome of [the]
case to decide whether the circuit court correctly characterized a domain name as a 'form
of intellectual property."' Id.
132 See In re theDot, 101 USPQ2d at 1068-69.
133 See Part II.A.2.
134 See Kremen, 337 F3d at 1030.
135 2014 WL 5858095 (DDC 2014). The plaintiffs have appealed the decision, but as
of August 28, 2015, no decision has been rendered. Stern v Islamic Republic of Iran, No
14-7203 (DC Cir filed Dec 22, 2014).
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involvement in a 1997 Hamas terror attack.136 The plaintiffs
have been attempting to collect from the three countries' as-
sets over the past two decades 1 7 with little success. 38 Their
latest effort involved asking the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia to attach property of the three
countries allegedly in ICANN's possession; this property consist-
ed of the ccTLDs owned by the respective countries, including
corresponding non-Latin ccTLDs. 139
Stern raises a series of nested questions: Are ccTLDs prop-
erty subject to attachment? If so, who owns them? If the coun-
tries associated with given ccTLDs own some property interest
in the ccTLDs, where are the ccTLDs located? What weight
should be given to the contractual relations surrounding the
ccTLDs, such as the services provided by the individual ccTLD
registrars and the subdomain owners who have purchased do-
main names under the ccTLDs?140 Regardless of how these legal
questions should be answered, many early commentators agreed
that the plaintiffs in Stern should not prevail: the forced judicial
transfer of ccTLDs could potentially wipe out thousands of sub-
domains registered under the ccTLDs and would run the grave
risk of "splitting the root" if name-server operators, regional In-
ternet registries (RIRs), and network providers outside the
United States refused to comply with the court's judgment.141 In
other words, the conversation around the case immediately
shifted from whether the Stern plaintiffs should lose to how and
136 See Campuzano v Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F Supp 2d 258, 274-79 (DDC 2003).
137 See, for example, Rubin v The Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F3d 783, 784 (7th
Cir 2011).
13s But see Farivar, ICANN to Plaintiffs (cited in note 54) (suggesting that the plain-
tiffs succeeded in collecting against a home in Lubbock, Texas, owned by the former
Shah of Iran).
139 See Stern, 2014 WL 5858095 at *1. It is not clear what the Stern plaintiffs would
have done with the ccTLDs if the court had ruled in their favor. It is plausible that the
Stern plaintiffs simply hoped for leverage to bring Iran, Syria, and North Korea to the
bargaining table, but the countries may also have opted to privatize their name servers
such that individual ".ir," ".sy," and ".kp" subdomains each pointed to one IP address
within the respective countries and another in the outside world-in other words, they
could have decided to split the root. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
140 While many of these questions are specifically directed to ccTLDs given the con-
text of Stern, the same general uncertainty would apply to gTLDs as well.
141 See, for example, Farivar, ICANN to Plaintiffs (cited in note 54); David Post, Are
Internet Domain Names 'Property"? (Wash Post, Aug 1, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/66BH-B3PB.
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under what theory ICANN should be able to defeat the attach-
ment attempts.142
Ultimately, the district court ruled in favor of ICANN's
motion on a narrow version of the service theory. 143 It is worth
being precise about what the court decided: under District of
Columbia attachment law, ccTLDs "cannot be conceptualized
apart from the services provided" by the ccTLD managers and
name-server operators around the world, and as a result, ccT-
LDs are not attachable.4 But as the Stern court noted, "the con-
clusion that ccTLDs may not be attached in satisfaction of a
judgment under District of Columbia law does not mean that
they cannot be property. It simply means that they are not at-
tachable property within this statutory scheme."'145 Commenta-
tors in the Internet technical community hoping for a broad res-
olution to the question whether TLDs are property did not find
their answer in Stern.146
Given the importance of the underlying policy considera-
tions, it is worth examining in greater depth the questions un-
addressed by Stern. ICANN made a number of arguments in re-
sponse to Stern's motion to attach that directly attacked a
conception of TLDs as property, but the court did not reach
these arguments in rendering its decision. 147 Ultimately, the rel-
evant arguments can be classified into two categories, neither of
which is fully satisfactory.
First, ICANN argued that domain names are categorically
not property. To support this point, ICANN relied primarily on
the service theory of domains as exemplified by Lockheed and
Umbro: in ICANN's view, domain names are precluded from be-
ing categorized as property primarily because "a domain name
142 See, for example, Farivar, ICANN to Plaintiffs (cited in note 54). It is worth not-
ing that, despite the overall tenor of the commentary, ICANN was not a party to this
case. The plaintiffs attached ICANN in an attempt to get at the TLDs; ICANN responded
with a motion to quash, the resolution of which is Stern. See Stern, 2014 WL 5858095
at *2.
143 Stern, 2014 WL 5858095 at *3-4.
144 Id at *3.
145 Id at *3 n 2.
146 Nevertheless, some commentators consider this a victory for Internet stability
and common sense. See, for example, David Post, DC Court Rules That Top-Level Do-
main Not Subject to Seizure (Wash Post, Nov 13, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/R3D8-6HL8.
147 See generally Memorandum in Support of Non-party Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers' Motion to Quash Writs of Attachment, Rubin v The Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, Civil Action No 01-1655 (DDC filed July 29, 2014) ("Stern Brief').
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registration is the product of a contract for services between the
registrar and registrant."148 ICANN then drew on the familiar
comparison between domain names and telephone numbers or
street addresses from Lockheed.149 As ICANN somewhat cor-
rectly and somewhat misleadingly concluded, "[I]n assessing
whether domain names ... can be considered 'property,' nu-
merous courts from various jurisdictions have found that they
cannot."150
But as noted in Part II.A, a litany of case law and statutory
law also points in the opposite direction. "Numerous courts from
various jurisdictions" have recognized property interests in do-
main names, under theories ranging from trademark and civil
forfeiture to intangible property. The service theory has its own
foothold and, given its origins in the case law, it seems particu-
larly strong in areas such as garnishment and judgment collec-
tion.151 But ICANN's assertion is strikingly inaccurate as an ac-
count of the entirety of domain name doctrine, which includes
the PTO's recognition of intellectual property interests in
TLDs,152 a statutory scheme under the ACPA and PRO-IP Act
that explicitly considers domain names to be seizable property, 153
and Kremen's recognition of a tangible property interest that can
be converted and subsequently transferred.154
ICANN's related assertions similarly fall flat, including its
claims that a ccTLD is "not capable of a precise definition," be-
cause it is constantly changing as new subdomains are added
and deleted; that a ccTLD has no established market for sale or
purchase; and that a ccTLD has no value apart from the routing
and administrative services provided by the ccTLD manager. 55
Kremen addressed the first point convincingly.156 Regarding the
148 Id at *11 (quotation marks omitted).
149 Id at *10-12.
150 Id at *11.
151 See Part ILB. 1. But see also notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
152 See Part II.A.1.
153 See Part II.A.2. To be fair to ICANN, it is not obvious that decisions such as
Kremen and statutory schemes such as the ACPA and PRO-IP Act, which directly ad-
dress subdomains, should also apply to TLDs. But the same argument would also apply
to Lockheed and Umbro, two cases that ICANN cites for support. Ultimately, arguments
drawing parallels between subdomains and TLDs must account for the breadth of doc-
trine on the subdomain side-breadth that includes abstract-property theories as well as
service theories.
154 See Part II.A.3.
155 Stern Brief at *10 (cited in note 147).
156 Kremen, 337 F3d at 1035 ("Network Solutions also argues that the DNS is not
a document because it is refreshed every twelve hours when updated domain name
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second point, TLDs have been bought, sold, and transferred, as
the case of Tuvalu and ".tv" (discussed below) makes clear. 1 7
The last point, that a TLD has no value apart from the services
provided by the TLD administrator to the Internet community,
seems especially odd given that ICANN recognizes a country's
right to designate its own ccTLD manager. Indeed, a sovereign's
interest in administering its TLD to certain specifications-for
example, excluding noncitizens from registering subdomains-
may be at odds with a broader conception of the public interest,
which, as expressed by ICANN, is explicitly global.158
ICANN's second argument fares no better. Even if ccTLDs
are property, ICANN argued, they are not owned by their re-
spective countries. 159 Two principles support this argument.
First, ICANN cites internal policy documents, which state that
"the ccTLD is operated in trust in the public interest and that
any claim of intellectual property rights in the two-letter code in
itself shall not impede any possible future change of
[r]egistry."160 As ICANN interprets these documents, countries
"do not possess the sole power to determine or control what enti-
ties will operate the ccTLDs assigned to their countries."161
ICANN's citation of this document is misleading. First, it is
not at all clear why ICANN's internal policies should have au-
thority, either binding or persuasive, in a US legal proceeding-
ICANN is a nongovernmental entity with no delegated legisla-
tive powers of its own.162 Second, the document itself notes that
it is "not intended to be binding" on the countries or on ccTLD
information is broadcast across the Internet .... [But a] document doesn't cease being a
document merely because it is often updated.").
157 See Part II.C.
158 See Part II.C.
159 See Stern Brief at *13-16 (cited in note 147).
160 Id at *14 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted), citing Governmental Advisory
Committee, Principles and Guidelines for the Delegation and Administration of Country
Code Top Level Domains 9.1.3 (ICANN, Apr 5, 2005), archived at
http://perma.ccWF8N-DF6U.
161 Stern Brief at *14 (cited in note 147).
162 See Froomkin, 50 Duke L J at 71 (cited in note 13). One argument might be that
if legal doctrine should generally defer to community norms in the absence of externali-
ties, then ICANN's policies should be persuasive authority given that they ostensibly
represent the Internet community's viewpoint. But ICANN has been often criticized as
poorly representing community interests in DNS governance. See, for example, John
Palfrey, The End of the Experiment: How ICANN's Foray into Global Internet Democracy
Failed, 17 Harv J L & Tech 409, 446 (2004); Feld, Structured to Fail at 350, 357-58
(cited in note 22).
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registrars.163 For this guidance to be operative, ICANN would
"need both Governments and Registries voluntarily to agree to
apply them within their legal framework. If either the Govern-
ment or the registry decide not to adopt the principles, this can-
not be held against the registry, and the registry still has a valid
existence.164 ICANN thus explicitly acknowledges that it lacks
the inherent authority to impose conditions on a government's
administration of its delegated ccTLD. Governments can in-
deed effectuate transfers of their ccTLDs, either from a trusted
nonaffiliated registrar or to a designated private party. 65
ICANN's marshaling of conditions for transfer is applicable only
if countries have voluntarily consented to ICANN guidelines; if a
country can voluntarily enter into an agreement with ICANN, it
can also refuse to enter such an agreement and choose to admin-
ister its ccTLD as it wishes.166 The idea that countries refusing
ICANN's policies cannot unilaterally control their own ccTLDs is
flatly contradicted by both extralegal events sanctioned by
ICANN and ICANN's own internal policies.
The second aspect of ICANN's argument is that countries do
not have the right to exclude registrants from the ccTLDs, be-
cause "the entire premise of a ccTLD is that it will be used and
enjoyed by many who choose to register, operate and visit do-
main names within that ccTLD.167 This argument is flatly con-
tradicted by the practices of major ccTLD registry operators op-
erating with ICANN's support. Canada, for example, disallows
registration of domain names for noncitizens, nonresidents, and
institutions without a territorial presence in Canada.16s The
United States imposes similar conditions,169 and the United
Kingdom requires that prospective registrants list a UK postal
address. 70 On a more basic level, ccTLD domain registrars uni-
formly impose fees that a registrant must pay either yearly or
upon application-or both-to register and operate a particular
163 GAC, Principles and Guidelines at 1.3 (cited in note 160).
164 Id (emphasis added).
165 See Part I.C.
166 See Sonbuchner, Note, 17 Minn J Intl L at 196 (cited in note 55).
167 Stern Brief at *14 (cited in note 147).
168 See Sarah Georges, ccTLD Registration Guidelines (Hover, Jan 8, 2013), archived
at http://perma.cc/KLE7-H53N.
169 See The usTLD Nexus Requirements Policy (Neustar, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/7MEG-HJZ3.
170 See Rules (Nominet, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/JFR3-HYZW. Nominet is
the ".uk" registry operator.
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subdomain.' 71 These are all obvious exercises of exclusion, no
matter how they are justified.
However, there is a stronger version of ICANN's second ar-
gument that, perhaps for policy reasons, ICANN did not make.
As noted in ICANN's brief, the United States Department of
Commerce retains ultimate control over the root zone file.172 As a
result, ICANN would not be able to transfer the Iranian, Syrian,
or North Korean ccTLDs to the plaintiffs without Department of
Commerce consent (or a similarly binding court order).173 The
implications of this state of affairs are troubling to the Internet
technical community because there is a plausible case to be
made that, either de jure or de facto, the US government owns
all ccTLDs and gTLDs.174 This control over the root zone file may
have certain advantages-stability, in particular-but Internet
advocates bristle at a single government potentially exercising
control to the detriment of the global public interest.175
Any unilateral action by the US government would run the
risk of fracturing the web if the other name-server operators de-
cided to split the root zone file, as Postel briefly attempted to do
in the 1990s. 176 While the US government operates the A name
server via Verisign, the B through M servers voluntarily syn-
chronize with the A server. 177 Every stakeholder involved wants
to avoid the DNS "nuclear option," but nevertheless the name-
server operators retain the technical capability to split the root.
With this in mind, the legal and normative cases for US-
government ownership of ccTLDs are murky.
171 See, for example, Pricing Schedule (Nominet, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/6E5Y-RXVV.
172 See Stern Brief at *7 ("[T]he U.S. Department of Commerce ... is responsible for
verifying that processing procedures have been followed, and authorising any related
changes to the DNS root zone and root zone database.") (quotation marks omitted).
173 See id at *18-19.
174 See Markus Muiller, 15 Fordham Intel Prop, Media & Enter L J at 712-13 (cited
in note 18).
175 See Sonbuchner, Note, 17 Minn J Intl L at 205-06 (cited in note 55).
176 See Muller, 15 Fordham Intel Prop, Media & Enter L J at 725 (cited in note 18)
("[T]he country-code TLDs are dependent on the root file that is only under U.S. con-
trol.... [T]he United States, by virtue of its control of the root file, can cause great diffi-
culties for a country by transferring the authority for the country-code TLD to an entity
outside that country.").
177 Verisign also operates the J name server. See J.root-servers.net (Verisign), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/L4Z4-VA83.
1486 [82:1457
2015] A Stern Look at the Property Status of Top-Level Domains 1487
The precedential development around TLDs has been slow
and narrow. Courts addressing TLDs have largely chipped away
at small problems involving the particular sets of facts in front
of them, and the number of data points is limited. Despite this
lethargy, two broad theories have emerged: the intangible prop-
erty theory (as represented by trademark, civil forfeitures, and
Kremen) on the one hand, and the services theory (employed by
Lockheed, Umbro, and Stern) on the other. Another relevant fac-
tor, however, is how these theories are reflected in extralegal
practice: ICANN and TLD registries make many decisions with-
out consulting the courts and with varying amounts of input
from the Internet community.
C. Extralegal Events
If users and administrators of TLDs have reached a consen-
sus on which property rights accrue in TLDs, the legal system
might consider these the norms of the industry.178 Of course, pri-
vate TLD transactions may impose significant externalities on
third parties, and the law should give deference to insider cus-
toms only to the extent that they account for this possibility.179
Two major extralegal events bearing on these norms are rele-
vant to this Comment. Ultimately, each involves reassigning
ccTLD administration under the guise of official ICANN proce-
dures. But the differences in these two developments are key,
and they suggest a stronger vision of sovereign rights over
ccTLD operation than one might glean from reading ICANN's
policy statements.
First, in 2001, Australia successfully petitioned ICANN to
reassign the ".au" ccTLD from its incumbent registrar to a new
organization, auDA, which was chosen by the Australian gov-
ernment.180 The incumbent registrar was Robert Elz, a personal
friend of Jon Postel who had administered ".au" voluntarily
178 For a discussion of the evolution and value of such norms, see generally Benson,
1 J L, Econ & Pol 269 (cited in note 10).
179 Property rights serve an important role in recognizing which externalities the
legal system forces owners to internalize. See Joseph William Singer, How Property
Norms Construct the Externalities of Ownership, in Gregory S. Alexander and Eduardo
M. Pefialver, eds, Property and Community 57, 60-66 (Oxford 2010).
180 See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, IANA Report on Request for Redel-
egation of the .au Top-Level Domain (Aug 31, 2001), archived at http://perma.cc/8M
AB-5X38.
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since its inception. The Australian government's view, adopted
by ICANN, was that the ".au" ccTLD "should be managed by an
organization formally accountable to the Australian Internet
community."181 There were two major issues with this transfer.
The first was that ICANN's internal guidelines seem to require
a finding of "misconduct, or violation of [ICANN] policies set
forth in this document and RFC 1591 ... or persistent, recurring
problems with the proper operation of a domain."182 But as
ICANN noted, "[T]he .au ccTLD [had] developed well to date un-
der the personal stewardship of Mr. Elz."183 The second issue
was that while ICANN stresses the importance of consulting lo-
cal Internet users and governing ccTLDs by community consen-
sus, 184 it is unclear whether ICANN consulted anyone other than
Elz (who opposed the transfer) and the Australian authorities
(who were pushing for the transfer). Despite ICANN's assurance
that "there is widespread-nearly universal-support for mov-
ing the delegation of the .au ccTLD to an organization permit-
ting broad participation of the Australian Internet community in
the development of policy, 185 one of the most prominent Austral-
ian Internet-infrastructure companies expressed serious con-
cerns about auDA (the proposed delegee).s86 Regardless, auDA
was deemed the appropriate delegee.87 The lesson of the ".au"
redelegation is that if a country wishes to redelegate its ccTLD
registrar, it has at least some authority to do so unilaterally.
The second major event relevant to this Comment is Tu-
valu's lease of the ".tv" registration to Verisign.188 Tuvalu dele-
gated the registry operations of ".tv" to the DotTV Corporation
in 1998; Verisign purchased the DotTV Corporation in 2001 for
181 Id.
182 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICP.1: Internet Domain
Name System Structure and Delegation (ccTLD Administration and Delegation) (May
1999), archived at http://perma.cc/7JSW-MKYQ, citing Postel, RFC 1591 (cited in note
1). RFC 1591 lays out the basic design and principles for the DNS. See J. Klensin, Reflec-
tions on the DNS, RFC 1591, and Categories of Domains (Internet Engineering Task
Force Network Working Group, Feb 2001), archived at http://perma.cc/4FT2-PV6B.
183 LANA, LANA Report on Request for Redelegation (cited in note 180).
184 See id (discussing the importance of local interests and ICANN participation in
cooperative arrangements).
185 Id.
186 See A. Michael Froomkin, How ICANN Policy Is Made (II) (ICANN Watch, Sept
5, 2001), archived at http://perma.cc/W3RY-F4HV.
187 See LANA, LANA Report on Request for Redelegation (cited in note 180).
188 Verisign operates the ".com" and ".net" gTLDs as well as the A and J name serv-
ers. See Company Information - about Verisign (Verisign), archived at http://perma.cc/L7
EB-GTVS.
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$45 million.189 Although ICANN at one point resisted officializ-
ing the transfer to Verisign,190 Verisign ultimately succeeded in
what strongly resembles a purchase of a ccTLD-with the coun-
try's consent, of course-despite ICANN's insistence that TLDs
cannot be bought or sold. Verisign is now listed as the "technical
contact" for the ".tv" ccTLD according to IANA,19' but it offers
registration services and is generally considered the registry op-
erator. 192 Ultimately, it appears that Tuvalu avoided the need for
ICANN's approval of the transfer.93
The Verisign deal now accounts for a significant portion of
Tuvalu's GDP. Estimates range from $2.2 million per year (ap-
proximately 6 percent of Tuvalu's annual GDP94) to at least $4
million per year (approximately 10 percent of Tuvalu's annual
GDP).195 The ".tv" ccTLD is home to a number of valuable sub-
domains, chief among them "Twitch.tv" (recently acquired by
Amazon for $1.1 billion).196 Tuvalu and Verisign have built a ver-
itable empire on the back of the ".tv" ccTLD.
The ".au" and ".tv" examples show that certain countries
have successfully asserted some forms of property rights in their
ccTLDs. It is difficult to read the ".au" redelegation as based on
any principle other than Australia's sovereign ability to decide
who can administer its ccTLD,197 and Tuvalu shows the ability of
countries to alienate the right of ccTLD administration if they so
189 See Noam Cohen, As Online Video Surges, the. TV Domain Rides the Wave (NY
Times, Aug 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/J9PM.QS62.
190 See Declaration of Charles A. Gomes in Opposition to Special Motion to Strike
of Defendant Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Verisign Inc v
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Civil Action No 04-1292, *5-6
(CD Cal filed Apr 28, 2004).
191 Internet Assigned Names Authority, Delegation Record for .TV (June 19, 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/L9RA-U8F4.
192 See .TV and .CC Registry Policies (Verisign, July 29, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/4VCG-SF4K ('Werisign manages the authoritative registry ... for all do-
main name registrations that end in '.TV."').
193 However, it is not clear whether ICANN has the authority to oppose a ccTLD
transfer. See Part II.B.2.
194 See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Tuvalu, archived at
http://perma.cc/N8DM-B6JR.
195 See Metcalf, A ccTLD Case Study (cited in note 29).
196 See Nick Wingfield, What's Twitch? Gainers Know, and Amazon Is Spending $1
Billion on It (NY Times, Aug 25, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/H5XF-QD72.
197 As commentators have noted, the question of ICANN control over ccTLD regis-
trars is still largely in flux. See, for example, Sonbuchner, Note, 17 Minn J Intl L at 196
(cited in note 55).
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choose.198 The ".tv" redelegation indicates a potential narrowing
of the difference between gTLDs and ccTLDs: the significance of
".tv" in the market for subdomain registration has less to do
with anything specifically Tuvaluan and more to do with the
commercial value of ".tv" to the broadcast-video market as a
whole. At the same time, the movement within gTLDs has been
away from a utopian public-interest model and toward a com-
mercially oriented sponsor model, as evidenced by the expansion
of gTLD delegations since 2012.199
It is important to also note that the Tuvalu example shows
that a marketplace and a mechanism already exist for transfer
of ccTLDs: although ICANN asserted in Stern that no protocol
exists for the transfer of ccTLD administration from a country
to a third party, these transfers are possible. If property is
seen as a bundle of rights including the rights to use, exclude,
and alienate (among others), it would seem as though most of
these rights belong to countries, despite ICANN's statements
of policy.200
The picture is less clear for gTLD registry operators. gTLD
administration is granted on a contractual basis between the
registry and ICANN.201 While there is only one "owner" of a
gTLD, administration of a gTLD comes with stipulations and
conditions. Although industry norms provide some guidance on
the proper treatment of ccTLDs-one that employs some sort of
property rights recognition-there is no easy takeaway for
gTLDs.202 The most that can be said is that ICANN's actual ex-
ercise of control over gTLDs is much more pronounced than it is
over ccTLDs.
198 A gTLD registry would not be able to do what Tuvalu did without first seeking
ICANN approval, because even the ccTLDs that have signed agreements with ICANN
can nevertheless choose not to follow their stated obligations. See Part II.B.2. In con-
trast, agreements between gTLD registry operators and ICANN impose significantly
more conditions. See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Registry
Agreement, archived at http://perma.cc/AXK5-PP7H.
199 See, for example, note 84 and accompanying text.
200 See ICANN, ICP-1 (cited in note 182).
201 See ICANN, Registry Agreement (cited in note 198).
202 Perhaps one takeaway is that ICANN owns all gTLDs-or simply administers
them as part of its lANA function contract with the Department of Commerce. While in-
tuitively appealing, this is a proposal that both ICANN and the United States would ve-
hemently deny. See notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
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Returning to the fundamental questions asked by Stern-
whether a TLD is property, and if it is, who owns it-the case
law, statutory frameworks, and extralegal norms do not conclu-
sively support any particular overarching approach. One ap-
proach-the Kremen abstract-property theory-seems most ac-
curate in certain realms: trademarks, conversions, and maybe
ccTLDs more broadly all seem to indicate that TLDs are ab-
stract or intangible property. Another approach-the service
theory as developed by Lockheed and Umbro and later adopted
by Stern-stands in contrast to the abstract-property theory:
within certain statutory frameworks, and especially creditor-
debtor law, the web of agreements and interconnections seems
to make a property-centric view of TLDs anachronistic. ICANN
itself, however, argues for a third theory in Stern, which has in-
tuitive appeal but not much practical support: perhaps TLDs are
just held in public trust and should not be thought of as legal ob-
jects at all. As the next Part will argue, these competing theories
of TLDs' property status operate not only on an interpretive lev-
el-that is, a level that seeks to harmonize the existing cases,
statutes, and extralegal events-but also on a normative one.
III. INADEQUACIES OF EXISTING THEORIES, AND A NEW
CONTENDER
It is tempting to view the cases, statutes, and extralegal
events discussed above as reconcilable. Each addresses the
property status of domain names and TLDs in a relatively nar-
row context; in addition, theories of trademarks, attachment,
and civil forfeiture each impose different standards on property
determination. Indeed, no uniform standard for property exists
across the legal field.203 Rather, TLDs may be a kind of quasi
property, embodying some but not all of the traditional rights
commonly associated with property. 204
The problem with a piecemeal approach to legal determi-
nations of TLDs' property status is that, outside of the limited
contexts that have been addressed by courts so far, investors,
203 Of course, traditional definitions of property-a bundle of the essential rights
to use, exclude, alienate, and sometimes destroy-abound. See generally, for example,
Penner, 43 UCLA L Rev 711 (cited in note 108).
204 For other examples of quasi property, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Quasi-
Property: Like, but Not Quite Property, 160 U Pa L Rev 1889, 1894-1909 (2012).
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policymakers, and TLD operators cannot be sure of either what
they can do with TLDs or how vulnerable they might be to a suit
challenging their perceived property rights. For this reason,
clarity about exactly which rights are assigned to TLDs is vital.
Private parties frequently engage in transactions around exist-
ing property entitlements. Pinning down a legal definition will
provide stability by allowing parties to better predict where the
legal entitlements will fall in cases of dispute, thus enabling bet-
ter bargaining.205
This Part identifies four normative objectives relating to
TLDs in order to show how existing solutions fail to account for
the breadth of data points relevant to TLDs. These four norma-
tive considerations are all important for resolving which theory
should prevail, but they may be viewed hierarchically; in partic-
ular, this Comment argues that stability of the DNS should be
valued highest in any evaluation. Under this framework, four
potential theories compete for viability: the abstract-property
and service theories identified above, a public-trust theory advo-
cated by ICANN, and a theory that TLDs are similar to FCC li-
censes. Ultimately, a solution recognizing TLDs as licenses
would be the best compromise among competing normative con-
siderations. In practice, ICANN's current approach to granting
administrative control over particular TLDs strongly resembles
that of the FCC in allocating license rights. Legal doctrine
should recognize this similarity and apply elements of FCC li-
cense rights to the law of TLDs.
A. Normative Arguments
What policy arguments should inform the categorization of
TLDs as property or nonproperty? Among the field of potential
considerations, four in particular are most relevant to TLDs:
stability, predictability, community interest, and descriptive
accuracy.
The first two considerations, stability and predictability, are
interrelated: given the massive investment in domain names by
intellectual property holders and the growth of e-commerce gen-
erally, any solution that decreased Internet stability would
have significant social costs. Similarly, the Internet as a whole
205 For a discussion on entitlements and bargaining, see Guido Calabresi and A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1093-95 (1972).
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creates a social surplus: everyday users of the network gain
enormous benefits from the communication and interconnection
that an open Internet enables, so some way of ensuring recogni-
tion of community interests in the DNS is vital. Finally, the le-
gal regime surrounding TLDs should aim to be descriptively ac-
curate in order to avoid creating counterproductive legal rules or
alienating global Internet stakeholders.
The major normative argument against recognition of a
property interest in TLDs is that the forced transfer of TLDs
could jeopardize both Internet stability and the unity of the
web.206 Name-server operators, ccTLD registrars, and local In-
ternet service providers could refuse to comply with US court
orders-in short, they could split the root. If this were to hap-
pen, the Internet would devolve into two internets: name servers
complying with US court orders, and name servers not comply-
ing. 20 7 The worst-case scenario for the DNS-in which users of
different networks can no longer communicate directly-will
have come to pass. ICANN's governance of the Internet rests on
a fragile consensus, and if US law takes an aggressive stance on
the property status of TLDs, the future of the open Internet
could be jeopardized.
A second, related normative principle is the need for pre-
dictability. Of course, a stable DNS would be predictable. But a
DNS that has some unstable characteristics-for example, one
in which TLDs occasionally fold or transfer against the wishes
of the subdomain owners underneath it-could nevertheless al-
so be predictable. And conversely, because TLDs may not be
created equally with respect to their perceived stability, an un-
predictable system might lead subdomain owners toward TLDs
about which they have the most knowledge-regardless of
whether that migration is an overall social good. For example, a
".tv" TLD might give more information to a consumer in the case
of a media company, but if the media company cannot predict
the future existence of ".tv," this information benefit may not
occur. Transfer of a TLD could wipe out subdomains under-
neath it,208 which would discourage investment in domain
206 See Feld, Structured to Fail at 357 (cited in note 22).
207 ICANN does have contracts with name-server operators, regional Internet regis-
tries, and some ccTLD administrators that bind them to synchronize with the A server.
See id at 349-50. Enforcing these contracts, however, runs into the same issues as en-
forcing a court order.
208 See Farivar, ICANN to Plaintiffs (cited in note 54).
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names. Concerns over uncertain potential transfers of ccTLDs
might encourage companies to migrate to gTLDs or to whichever
TLDs are seen as the most stable, whether generic or country
code.209
If consumers of domain names view the stability of various
TLDs as unpredictable, centralization may occur. For example,
if the founders of Twitch.tv had felt concern over the status of
the ".tv" domain, they may have opted to launch their site on a
TLD whose future existence was more certain. Centralization of
domain name registration increases costs to companies and re-
duces consumers' access to information. If every company were
compelled to register a ".com" subdomain, for example, these
subdomains would become extremely expensive compared to
identical subdomains on different TLDs.10 New ventures would
face increased barriers to entry as prime subdomains all become
registered. Because subdomains communicate information about
a business or entity to Internet users, too much concentration in,
for example, ".com" hurts consumers' ability to gather infor-
mation about the companies with which they wish to transact.211
The entire Internet benefits from predictability in the DNS in
the form of reduced costs to domain name registrants and in-
creased information gains to Internet consumers.
A third normative consideration asserts that because the
smooth operation of the Internet relies on the consent and co-
operation of various global stakeholders, decisions about prop-
erty rights should recognize the interests of the Internet com-
munity.212 The Internet community at large is not necessarily
209 For more on the economic value of legal certainty, see Nestor M. Davidson, Prop-
erty's Morale, 110 Mich L Rev 437, 445-47 (2011).
210 Verisign's market power over the DNS as registrar of the ".com" gTLD has
been criticized as monopolistic. See, for example, Smith, 20 Richmond J L & Tech at
17 (cited in note 62). However, the new gTLD program has aimed to increase competi-
tion in the gTLD namespace. See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers, About the Program (2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3HS8-2ZS5. Early signs
indicate success: new gTLDs have accounted for over 6.5 million new domain name
registrations since 2014. See nTLDStats (greenSec Solutions, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/DX3B-UHZZ. Additionally, ".com" faces competition from ccTLDs such
as ".tv" that aim toward commercial use outside their countries of origin. See, for exam-
ple, DomainWire, Domain Name Stat Report *2 (Council of European Top level Domain
Registries, May 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/77FX-X877 (noting that in 2013,
ccTLD registration was up 12 percent, as compared to 2 percent across gTLDs).
211 See Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name
System, 4 J Small & Emerging Bus L 149, 157-59 (2000).
212 See Vint Cerf, Patrick Ryan, and Max Senges, Internet Governance Is Our
Shared Responsibility, 10 I/S: J L & Pol Information Socy 1, 3-4 (2014).
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coextensive with the group of stakeholders who have the de fac-
to power to resist judgments or become parties to litigation in-
volving TLDs: RIRs, name-server operators, TLD registries, and
Internet service providers could each undermine Internet stabil-
ity, but the consent of Internet citizens and subdomain owners is
not required. This result is at odds not only with utopian concep-
tions of the Internet-such as those defining TLDs as communi-
ty property-but also with more conservative stances emphasiz-
ing the consequences of poor governance to individual Internet
users.213 Put another way, governance of the TLD namespace in-
volves significant risks of externalities to Internet users, recrea-
tional and corporate alike. DNS management should internalize
these risks.
However, this view should not be taken too far. A normative
theory that TLDs are property only insofar as they are commu-
nity property must wrestle with the fact that some body or pro-
cess must exist to resolve disputes over DNS control (even if this
"control" is not labeled as "ownership").214 ICANN may or may
not be the best problem solver, but the nature of the DNS does
not allow for pure decentralization. Someone must administer
the root zone file to prevent the constant addition, deletion, and
transfer of TLDs.215
Finally, legal doctrine involving TLDs and property rights
should be descriptively accurate regarding the technical prac-
tices of the DNS. Descriptive accuracy aids legitimacy; a court
order that does not appear to understand the technology runs
an increased risk of enacting counterproductive legal rules and
alienating Internet stakeholders.216 Further, descriptive accu-
racy helps courts know when to distinguish different aspects of
the DNS and when to change the doctrine in cases of technical
213 See, for example, Michael Xun Liu, Note, Jurisdictional Limits of In Rem Pro-
ceedings against Domain Names, 20 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 467, 491 (2014) (not-
ing that "the exercise of in rem jurisdiction under the ACPA also harms individual inter-
ests by undermining party expectations and creating procedural unfairness for foreign
litigants").
214 See Goldsmith and Wu, Who Controls the Internet? at 31 (cited in note 26).
215 See id at 32.
216 See, for example, Kentucky v 141 Internet Domain Names, 2008 WL 5261775,
*15-22 (KY Cir). The court in 141 Internet Domain Names found that domain names
were property located in the Commonwealth of Kentucky because the domain names
were listed on interfaces (webpages) shown to web users in Kentucky, describing the do-
main names as "virtual keys for entering and creating virtual casinos." Id at *23. For a
longer discussion of the weaknesses of this opinion, see Mellyn, 42 Georgetown J Intl L
at 1251-53 (cited in note 63).
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innovation or new business arrangements. Descriptive accu-
racy may simply be seen as an end in itself-a legal system
too formal and too far removed from business practice is a bad
result even without consideration of the potential negative
consequences.
There may, of course, exist further normative considerations
through which to evaluate the potential theories underlying the
legal status of the DNS. This Comment does not attempt to de-
velop an exhaustive list. Instead, the four considerations identi-
fied above-stability, predictability, community interest, and
descriptive accuracy-are included as a reflection of priorities.
B. Evaluation of Competing TLD Theories
With these four considerations in mind, it is now possible to
evaluate the various theories of TLD property rights against a
normative backdrop. No theory perfectly accounts for all poten-
tial considerations. However, any evaluation of which theory is
best suited for widespread adoption by US courts should explic-
itly weigh these normative principles against each other. In par-
ticular, this Comment argues that stability-specifically, avoid-
ing splitting the root-should be recognized as the primary
consideration for the various theories of TLDs' property status.
In part because existing theories do a poor job of accounting for
stability, courts should look to FCC licenses as an exemplar. As
seen below, ICANN's current policies on TLDs strongly resemble
a license model; they strike a balance between public obligation
and private rights that deftly solves the problems presented by
the four normative considerations identified in this Comment.
1. Shortcomings of the service theory.
The service theory of TLDs fares reasonably well with refer-
ence to the normative considerations discussed above. The main
advantage of this theory is that it keeps in full view the web of
interdependencies on which the Internet rests. 17 This ad-
vantage should not be understated: litigation is often an inef-
fective tool with which to make policy decisions about TLDs
and property rights, because people and entities who are not
parties to the litigation will tend to be underrepresented. The
service theory helps safeguard against a judicial system in
217 See Cerf, Ryan, and Senges, 10 I/S: J L & Pol Information Socy at 2-4 (cited in
note 212).
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which courts consider only the present parties rather than mak-
ing broad, legislative decisions-largely because under the ser-
vice theory, plaintiffs are unlikely to seek transfer of TLDs given
their low chances of victory.
The service theory also aids stability and predictability in a
narrow sense: it prevents bad results in some cases, such as the
possibility in Stern of the Iranian, Syrian, and North Korean
ccTLDs transferring to the plaintiffs.218 But this results-oriented
view obscures the possibility that a service theory could prove
less stable in a number of plausible cases. ICANN could redele-
gate a ccTLD registrar for political reasons if pressured by its
Governmental Advisory Committee (the mouthpiece of different
national governments within ICANN, known as "GAC") or by
the US government. 219 Indeed, ICANN's actions in the past have
been criticized as promoting certain policy goals at the expense
of Internet stability.220 If the legal system were to recognize a
property interest in TLDs, a powerful set of entities--countries,
designated ccTLD registrars, and the companies that operate
gTLD registries-would be given incentives and entitlements to
resist any political moves by ICANN that might jeopardize the
community-property nature of the DNS and the Internet gener-
ally. The question is less whether ICANN is trustworthy and
more how to structure Internet governance to prevent one or-
ganization from gaining too much control over critical Internet
infrastructure. Thus, a major failing of the service theory as
compared to regimes that recognize stronger rights for TLD op-
erators is that it fails to provide a check on the power of whatev-
er central authority retains control over the DNS-whether that
is ICANN now or another organization in the future.
Similarly, the service theory of TLD ownership fails to ac-
count for situations like Kremen in which a major injury occurs
because of a TLD owner but in which that party's only major as-
set is the TLD itself.221 What would happen if Verisign went
bankrupt or committed major financial fraud?222 How would
218 See Stern, 2014 WL 5858095 at *3. See also Part II.B.2.
219 According to some commentators, ICANN has already done so. See, for example,
Froomkin, How ICANN Policy Is Made (cited in note 186); Feld, Structured to Fail at 350
(cited in note 22).
220 Feld, Structured to Fail at 350 (cited in note 22).
221 See Kremen, 337 F3d at 1026-28.
222 Verisign does receive revenue from services apart from its registry operations,
but the right to administer the ".com," ".net," and ".tv" registries, among others, is one of
Verisign's most significant assets. See Verisign, Inc, Form 10-K: Annual Report pursuant
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ownership of the ".com" TLD be resolved under the service theo-
ry? The service theory of TLD ownership does not satisfactorily
account for this scenario.
A third major failing of the service theory is that it simply is
not an accurate description of what a TLD is.223 To be sure, oper-
ation of a TLD registry involves providing services to registrars
and subdomain registrants, and a TLD is valid only insofar as
the thirteen name servers contain entries recognizing the TLD
and its registry; that is, a TLD has content only when it both is
recognized under the DNS and itself recognizes subdomains.224
The fact that services are necessary to establish value in an ob-
ject is not dispositive of whether the underlying object contains a
property interest. The same service/property interactions exist
in trademarks and patents, for example.225 Simply because a
good requires certain services to be performed in order to be-
come socially valuable does not preclude it from being consid-
ered property.
2. Shortcomings of the abstract-property theory.
The abstract-property theory of TLDs has a conflicting but
overlapping set of normative concerns at its core. Accepting
Kremen's reasoning as applied to subdomains in short, that the
rights to use and exclude as they relate to a line on a name serv-
er are enough to qualify subdomains as abstract property-it is
difficult to see why TLDs should not be viewed in the same way.
A reserved line on a name server that grants the rights to use,
exclude, and alienate constitutes abstract property regardless of
whether it is called a subdomain or a TLD. To be sure, subdo-
mains are distinguishable from TLDs in that each subdomain
points to a unique IP address; a TLD divorced from the subdo-
mains it contains does not. 226
to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended
December 31, 2014 (SEC, Feb 13, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3NWD-XACP; Com-
pany Information - about Verisign (cited in note 188).
223 By comparison, Kremen's recognition of the value of a subdomain-controlling
what an end user sees when visiting a web address-seems to accord better with com-
mon understandings of property. See Kremen, 337 F3d at 1030.
224 See Milton L. Mueller, Internet Governance in Crisis: The Political Economy of
Top-Level Domains, archived at http://perma.cc/6YEB-B786.
225 See notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
226 This distinction is not as minor as it might seem. The primary use of a subdo-
main is to point end users to a viewable webpage; their property relevance largely arises
from the subdomain owner's right to direct the end user wherever the owner chooses.
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But it is far from self-evident that this distinction is legally
relevant. The rights exercised by a subdomain owner and the
rights exercised by a TLD administrator are not fundamentally
different. The TLD administrator may be bound by a contract
with ICANN to charge a fixed price for subdomain registration-
though this requirement is crumbling under the latest version of
the gTLD registry and registrar contracts.2 27 But the fact that
ICANN needs to impose these limitations of rights via the con-
tract form implies that a TLD administrator could exercise them
in the first place. Some version of the Kremen analysis, then,
would seem to apply to TLD registrars and registry operators,
given their apparent rights. For this reason, abstract property is
simply a more accurate definition of what ccTLDs are.
Unfortunately, the abstract-property theory fares poorly on
the other normative considerations. The difficult question for
proponents of an abstract-property theory is what to do with
Stern. As shown in Part II.B.2, the consequences of allowing the
Stern plaintiffs to seize the "r, ".sy," and ".kp" ccTLDs would
have been severe, potentially crippling Internet stability and
the unified web. The abstract-property theory as expressed in
Kremen struggles to come up with a principle preventing this
seizure.228
One approach might be to say that even if TLDs are some
kind of intangible property, the existing statutory schemes of at-
tachment and garnishment do not allow for seizure of that prop-
erty form. This approach has the advantage of reconciling Kre-
men with the Lockheed- Umbro-Stern line of cases, which
explicitly declined to comment on the broader definitional con-
cerns this Comment addresses. In other words, by focusing on
the narrow nature of each decision, this approach avoids conflict:
TLDs are one thing for the purposes of attachment in the Dis-
trict of Columbia or Virginia, another thing for conversion in
California, and another thing in the patent context.
But accepting this argument essentially leads back to
square one. If TLDs are some kind of abstract property with
some features of nonproperty, courts will have difficulty deciding
when and under what contexts TLDs should receive property
TLDs have no comparable function. See Mueller, Internet Governance in Crisis (cited in
note 224).
227 See ICANN, 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement (June 27, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/6RK4-JZSR.
228 See Kremen, 337 F3d at 1033-34.
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protection. This difficulty may lead to anomalous results that
undermine the general stability and predictability of the domain
name system. If parties cannot predict what courts will do when
questions regarding the property status of TLDs arise in litiga-
tion, they will struggle to arrange their affairs and manage the
potential risks of investing in subdomains under a particular
TLD. In other words, the abstract property theory has trouble
drawing lines with regard to what property protections are af-
forded to TLDs. Of course, a rights regime could be stable de-
spite taking an ad hoc, piecemeal approach, assuming that par-
ties know which contexts are protected and which are not. But
this seems unlikely from a practical perspective. The question of
property protections for TLDs could come up in numerous legal
contexts, each of which would have to be resolved individually
by different jurisdictions. And while these cases are pending, in-
dustry participants and policymakers will have to make deci-
sions on where to invest and what types of regulatory actions to
take-all of which could be undermined.
Another problem with the abstract-property theory is that it
fails to account for the Internet community's interest in a par-
ticular TLD. By its very nature, the abstract-property theory
recognizes a strong version of the right to exclude that is incom-
patible with a community-interest norm. If the TLD owner's
property interest subordinates the rights of the subdomain own-
ers relying on the TLD registry, subdomain owners will be at the
whim of the country's or registry operator's business decisions
and debts. For example, if Verisign makes a bad investment in a
major infrastructure project and declares bankruptcy, secured
creditors will have an entitlement over the billions of subdomain
owners under ".com" and ".net," as well as the other TLDs oper-
ated by Verisign. This is especially problematic for TLDs be-
cause the sheer number of subdomain owners affected by a sei-
zure of ".com" presents intractable collective action problems
precluding efficient bargains between subdomain owners and
creditors. The community interest in TLDs is not an expression
without content; rather, it reflects the real issues presented by
the open, international nature of the Internet.
3. A third contender: ICANN's public-trust theory.
If neither the abstract-property theory nor the service theo-
ry of TLDs is normatively acceptable, are there alternative theo-
ries, not yet recognized by courts, that might better protect the
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interests of stability, predictability, community interest, and de-
scriptive accuracy recognized above? One potential theory would
be ICANN's stance that TLDs are operated "in trust in the pub-
lic interest."229 This public-trust theory has not explicitly been
advanced as a theory of property by ICANN, but in its strongest
form it holds that TLDs are common resources that, by their
very nature, should be operated by consensus in the interests of
the community, including both current participants and future
Internet users.230 What exactly a "public trust" is in this context
is undeveloped but might be analogized to national parks or
public waterways: social welfare is maximized by some baseline
rules, but no private rights are recognized.31
The public-trust theory has a few strengths. First, it gives
credence to the community-interest norm. Even more than the
service theory, the public-trust theory accounts not only for the
web of interdependent name servers and TLD administrators
but also for current and future Internet users. Similarly, the
public-trust theory recognizes the value of DNS stability, be-
cause any disruptions or fractures in the DNS would be welfare
decreasing.
However, the public-trust theory is not uniformly superior
to the service theory or the abstract-property theory on the nor-
mative bases identified. One issue is that if the DNS is operated
in the public trust, it is unclear why the DNS should not be in
government hands. Notably, ICANN and many stakeholders-
including the US government-sharply disagree with this con-
ception. 232 The United States in particular has increasingly de-
nied control over the DNS, perhaps in response to criticism in
the international community of its influence on ICANN policy. 233
229 Stern Brief at *14 (cited in note 147) (quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
230 See id at *13-14; GAC, Principles and Guidelines (cited in note 160).
231 See, for example, Federal Land Policy and Management Act § 102(a)(8), Pub L
No 94-579, 90 Stat 2743, 2745 (1976), codified at 43 USC § 1701(a)(8):
[T]he public lands [shall] be managed in a manner that will protect the quality
of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric,
water resource, and archeological values; that, where appropriate, will pre-
serve and protect certain public lands in their natural condition; that will pro-
vide food and habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will
provide for outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use.
232 See White Paper, 63 Fed Reg at 31742-44 (cited in note 49) (arguing for and ex-
plaining the transition to private management of the DNS).
233 See Geoff Duncan, Why Is the U.S. Surrendering Control of the Internet? (And
Why Should You Care?) (Digital Trends, Mar 19, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/6UBL-XACP.
The University of Chicago Law Review
One answer to why the DNS should be kept out of govern-
ment hands might be that the DNS is a global system. The main
functions of the DNS-providing unique domain names for IP
addresses and ensuring uniformity across the various name
servers-address global issues.234 But this rejoinder raises ques-
tions of ICANN's authority as well as its origin. As a nonprofit
incorporated in California, ICANN was founded through US ini-
tiative and remains subject to US jurisdiction.235 If the DNS is
truly a global public good, perhaps it should be either operated
by an international body such as the United Nations or operated
similarly to other international agencies.236
The other disadvantage of the public-trust theory is that it
adds little predictability to the DNS. ICANN's corporate struc-
ture is arcane and provides no easy answers as to who actually
makes decisions or what weight should be given to the views of
particular stakeholders. 237 Given the complexity of property in-
terests, it is difficult to predict what factors ICANN will consider
or what norms ICANN will value in making decisions.238 Per-
versely, predictability is improved in the current system only if
ICANN operates poorly: if we know that ICANN will always be
swayed by whatever countries are able to exert the most politi-
cal pressure or that the GAC will be deadlocked by a power
struggle, commentators could foresee with some accuracy how
particular problems will be resolved. But the actual resolutions
might continue to be at odds with the interest of the general In-
ternet community.239
The service theory, abstract-property theory, and public-
trust theory are in some sense philosophically in tension
with each other: ultimately, they take fundamentally different
234 See Shackelford and Craig, 50 Stan J Intl L at 129-30 (cited in note 39).
235 See White Paper, 63 Fed Reg at 31741 (cited in note 49). See also Stern, 2014 WL
5858095 at *2.
236 This is essentially what the Generic Top-Level Domain Memorandum of Under-
standing proposed. See The Internet Community, Establishment of a Memorandum of
Understanding (cited in note 38).
237 See Froomkin, How ICANN Policy Is Made (cited in note 186).
238 Interestingly, ICANN has also identified predictability and certainty as core
normative considerations when discussing the gTLD expansion project. But commenta-
tors have noted that the gTLD application process has been anything but stable or pre-
dictable. See, for example, Michael D. Palage, ICANN's New gTLD Double Standard?
(CircleID, Mar 1, 2011), archived at http://perma.ccIHFV7-A62X. Michael D. Palage was
a member of the ICANN Board of Directors from 2003 to 2006. See Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers, Board of Directors, archived at http://perma.cc/R
LW6-9NGV.
239 See, for example, Froomkin, How ICANN Policy Is Made (cited in note 186).
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approaches to the treatment of TLDs. For this reason, each the-
ory carries different sets of normative strengths and weakness-
es. The service theory excels at providing stability--conditioned,
of course, on good stewarding by the organizations in charge of
the DNS-but is less descriptively accurate and provides no
built-in mechanism for community input. The abstract-property
theory, on the other hand, seems to match up well with how
courts and private parties have treated TLDs in the past, but it
could be disastrous to Internet stability if not tempered. Final-
ly, the public-trust theory is the only one to explicitly recognize
the importance of the public's interest in TLDs and the DNS
generally, but it fails to account for the other two concerns. As
mentioned above, it is possible that no theory will satisfactorily
address each concern. This Comment argues that viewing TLDs
as similar to FCC licenses does a better job of accounting for
stability, predictability, community interest, and descriptive ac-
curacy on the whole than any of the theories listed above.
4. TLDs as licenses.
FCC licenses strike a unique balance between a public-trust
theory of property rights and a private ownership model. Origi-
nally, wireless-spectrum regulation was explicitly oriented to-
ward public-trust norms: as the Supreme Court interpreted the
Communications Act of 1934,240 "[t]he purpose of the Act was to
protect the public interest in communications.241 Today, howev-
er, licenses incorporate aspects of private ownership. The rights
to use particular spectrum allocations are auctioned off through
competitive bidding,242 and a "shadow market" has emerged for
licensees to transfer the grant of spectrum. 243
FCC broadcast licenses authorize an entity to use a specific
frequency in the communications spectrum for a limited time-
seven years for radio, five years for television. The vast majority
of broadcast licenses are renewed at the end of their terms.244
240 Pub L No 73-416, 48 Stat 1064, codified as amended at 47 USC § 151 et seq.
241 Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc v Federal Communications Commission, 316 US 4,
14 (1942).
242 See, for example, 47 USC § 337(a) (stating that "the Commission shall allocate [a
portion of] the electromagnetic spectrum between 746 megahertz and 806 megahertz ...
by competitive bidding'); 47 USC § 309(j) (protecting the "[u]se of competitive bidding").
243 Krystilyn Corbett, Note, The Rise of Private Property Rights in the Broadcast
Spectrum, 46 Duke L J 611, 638 (1996).
244 See Bruce E. Rosenblum, Structuring and Restructuring Secured Loans to
Broadcasters, 1 J Bankr L & Prac 271, 272 (1992).
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Licensees may not freely transfer their rights but may apply to
the FCC to initiate transfers to third parties.245 Licenses grant
usage rights, of course, but these may be proscribed by the FCC;
the FCC can also limit the times of day during which a licensee
may broadcast.246
In the abstract, the FCC restricts access to a medium of
communication to maintain uniformity, prevent market confu-
sion, and solve a collective action problem that engenders high
transaction costs. This description applies similarly to ICANN's
agreements with TLD registry operators and registrars. Thus,
TLD-registry contracts may be viewed as the Internet parallel
of broadcast licenses: ICANN and the Department of Com-
merce grant certain private rights to the TLD registrar, such
as the right to exclude and the right to alienate subdomains,
while retaining a public right to regulate the TLD namespace
more generally.247
Put more concretely, the license theory states that ICANN's
contracts with TLD administrators are not mere service agree-
ments with no attached private rights passing to the registrars,
as spectrum licenses were under the old Communications Act of
1934 model; nor are they grants of property with all traditional
rights attached, as some commentators wish to see today with
FCC licenses.248 Rather, ICANN grants licenses that convey cer-
tain private rights while withholding or conditioning the use of
others.249 These licenses are not freely transferable-for exam-
ple, Verisign cannot simply sell off ".com" without ICANN's ap-
proval250Obut licensees may use, exclude, and sell subdomains
with relative freedom and exclusivity within their granted
245 See 47 USC § 310(d).
246 See 47 USC § 308(b).
247 For a more in-depth discussion of broadcast licenses, see Rosenblum, 1 J Bankr L
& Prac at 272-74 (cited in note 244).
248 For example, ccTLDs' registry agreements grant registrars certain private rights,
such as the right to exclude. Many countries impose geographic or citizenship require-
ments on prospective ccTLD subdomain registrants. See Part II.B.2.
249 FCC broadcast licenses operate similarly. Regulations prohibit the assignment of
FCC licenses but allow the licensee to initiate a process for transferring control over a
broadcast license subject to FCC approval. See 47 USC § 310(d).
250 ICANN conditions the grant of registry status for gTLDs on a lengthy agreement
with numerous restrictions placed on the gTLD registry operator. For example, gTLD
registry operators must price registrations and renewals in certain ways, and they must
seek ICANN approval for policy changes. Importantly, gTLD registry operators are not
free to transfer the registry to a third party without ICANN approval. See ICANN, Reg-
istry Agreement (cited in note 198).
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spheres. 251 Licensees are simultaneously both market partici-
pants bargaining for rights with ICANN and public trustees
subject to price restrictions and nondiscrimination policies.252
As a descriptive matter, it is important to separate the pos-
turing of stakeholders from the facts of the situation. Despite
protestations to the contrary-both from the Internet communi-
ty and the relevant parties-the United States holds de facto
power over the DNS.253 This is true regardless of whether the
United States' control is normatively desirable. Thus any solu-
tion that attempts to circumvent the essential facts of root zone
file control-such as ICANN's public-trust theory, which by im-
plication denies the hierarchical nature of the DNS-into some-
thing more palatable to government skeptics runs headfirst into
reality. Keeping Internet infrastructure outside the territorial
jurisdiction of individual governments might be a better system,
but it is not the system in place today.254
Keeping this in mind, a license system does a better job of
describing TLDs' property status as expressed by extralegal
transactions than either the pure abstract-property theory, the
service theory, or the public-trust theory does. Broadcast licens-
es are not directly reachable by creditors,255 and their transfer is
conditioned on FCC approval.256 This arrangement also accu-
rately depicts the property dynamic expressed on the one hand
by Stern and on the other by the Tuvalu and Australia redelega-
tions. It seems clear that the Stern outcome, although perhaps
cast in terms that are too narrow, is the best possible normative
outcome:257 ccTLDs should not be reachable by creditors or else
the stability of the Internet will be jeopardized.28 Similarly,
251 See id. ccTLD registrars have much more freedom to manage their registries
than gTLD registrars do. See GAC, Principles and Guidelines (cited in note 160).
252 For an argument that FCC broadcast licenses strike a balance between the pub-
lic rights and private rights models of ownership, see Corbett, Note, 46 Duke L J at 634
(cited in note 243).
253 See Part I.B.
254 Note that under both Operation in Our Sites and Stern, actions to initiate trans-
fer of a domain name or TLD can be litigated only in US courts because ICANN and the
major TLD registries are both located within the United States. See Part II.A.2 and Part
II.B.2.
255 See Rosenblum, 1 J Bankr L & Prac at 274 (cited in note 244).
256 See J. Armand Musey, Broadcasting Licenses: Ownership Rights and the Spec-
trum Rationalization Challenge, 13 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 307, 327 & n 74 (2012).
257 See Post, DC Court Rules That Top-Level Domain Not Subject to Seizure (cited in
note 146) (claiming that the decision reached by the court was "the right result for many
reasons").
258 See Part II.B.2.
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countries like Tuvalu that wish to lease a ccTLD to a third party
should have some rights to do so, subject to public-interest re-
strictions.259 The license theory of TLDs thus checks many of the
important boxes under an outcome-oriented analysis.
One concern with the license theory might be that private
licenses-licenses between two private parties, as distinct from
public licenses granted by a government-might be subject to
certain assignability principles that are too permissive when
applied to TLDs. For example, the United States Bankruptcy
Code allows a trustee to freely assume executory contracts, sub-
ject to few restrictions-none of which seems to apply to TLDs.260
Executory contracts-those in which both sides have important
performance obligations remaining261-are an obvious target for
TLD policy. If, as presented in the hypothetical above, a TLD
registry operator were to go bankrupt, both its contract with
ICANN and its numerous contracts with subdomain owners
would be considered executory contracts. But ICANN imposes
restrictions on TLD registry operators that potentially none of
the trustees would be able to satisfy.262 Both ICANN and most
likely all the subdomain owners would prefer that ICANN step
in and delegate the registries' obligations to a solvent, already-
trusted registry operator.
In contrast, public licenses such as FCC broadcast licenses
are not generally assumable in bankruptcy; creditors can take
an interest in the economic value generated by public licenses,
such as proceeds from sale, but because the FCC must approve
any transfer of a broadcast license, courts have wisely avoided
intruding on that process. 263 Courts should take a similar
stance when it comes to ICANN and TLDs. Although ICANN is
259 See Part II.C.
260 There are limitations to this doctrine: 11 USC § 365(c) specifies that executory
contracts cannot be assigned when applicable law excuses a party other than the debtor
from rendering third-party performance, when the contract is for a loan, or when the
contract is for nonresidential real property and has been terminated prior to bankruptcy.
11 USC § 365(c).
261 See Bob Eisenbach, Executory Contracts - What Are They and Why Do They
Matter in Bankruptcy? (In the (Red), July 18, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/N5R2
-LNGW.
262 See Registry Agreement (cited in note 198).
263 See In re Ridgely Communications, Inc, 139 Bankr 374, 379 (Bankr D Md 1992)
('The right of the licensee crucial to this decision ... is the right of the creditor to claim
proceeds received by the debtor licensee from a private buyer in exchange for the trans-
fer of the license to that buyer."); In re TerreStar Networks, Inc, 457 Bankr 254, 262-65
(Bankr SDNY 2011) (providing an overview of doctrinal issues in bankruptcy-related as-
signation of FCC licenses).
1506 [82:1457
2015] A Stern Look at the Property Status of Top-Level Domains 1507
a private nonprofit, its main function is execution of a govern-
ment contract, 64 and it imposes transfer requirements on TLDs
similar to those that the FCC imposes on broadcast licenses.
A second concern might be economic. Just as Professor
Ronald Coase and others have argued for a market-based ap-
proach to broadcast licensing,65 a better way to handle TLD reg-
istration might be to let firms bid on, sell, and otherwise freely
alienate TLD registration licenses. ICANN's approach has more
closely resembled the old FCC methods-something like central
planning.266 A common objection might then be that if ICANN's
TLD agreements are similar to broadcast licenses, ICANN
should more closely follow the FCC's trajectory over the past
half century and move to a more market-based model.
It is true, however, that the FCC, while adopting some as-
pects of a market approach, has retained other centralized char-
acteristics. As mentioned above, the transfer of a broadcast li-
cense is conditioned on FCC approval.267 Further, ICANN must
navigate the international nature of Internet infrastructure in a
way not required of the FCC. If, for example, ICANN auctioned
off ".sy" and the company that bought it announced that it would
not renew subdomain agreements with Syrian clients, a poten-
tial response from Syria would be to simply split the root: ".sy"
would point to one thing within Syria and another thing every-
where else.268 This scenario-splitting the root-is essentially
the nuclear winter of domain name policy.269 ICANN and other
important stakeholders are wise to choose paths that avoid this
outcome.
In this way, the license model shares some of the same po-
tential issues as the service model: it places significant trust and
264 See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Affirmation of
Commitments by the United States Department of Commerce and the Internet Corpora-
tion for Assigned Names and Numbers (Sept 30, 2009), archived at
http:llperma.cc/B9XM-9NLY.
265 See generally, for example, R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 2 J L & Econ 1 (1959).
266 For a comparison of ICANN and FCC policies, see Karl M. Manheim and Law-
rence B. Solum, An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy, 25 Hastings Comm &
Enter L J 359, 411-51 (2003).
267 See 47 USC § 310(d). See also notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
268 Syria in particular is known for taking an aggressive approach to Internet issues;
for example, local Internet for the entire country was shut down in 2012. See lain
Thomson, Syria Cuts Off Internet and Mobile Communications (The Register, Nov 29,
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/SLR5-AMGZ.
269 See A. Michael Froomkin, Form and Substance in Cyberspace, 6 J Small &
Emerging Bus L 93, 109-10 (2002).
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responsibility in ICANN. The license model is only as good as
the policies ICANN chooses to pursue through its terms and re-
strictions on TLD administration, and those policies will be in-
fluenced by ICANN's governance structure. On the other hand, a
strong property model that recognizes more rights in TLD regis-
trars might be less subject to potential institutional decline on
the part of ICANN and more amenable to international in-
volvement. Because ICANN is incorporated in the United
States, it may continue to find itself dragged into court to defend
cases like Stern.
Although the license model is the most accurate description
of current practice both within the legal system and in extrale-
gal transactions, courts and policy makers today have a choice.
ICANN and the various TLDs it controls through the root zone
file are subject to US jurisdiction to the extent that courts or leg-
islators wish them to be. Deciding which approach is normative-
ly preferable ultimately comes down to how much the worries
exemplified in Stern-that is, about Internet stability and split-
ting the root-matter compared to worries about potential dys-
function within ICANN.270 This Comment opts for the license
model not simply out of a commitment to descriptive accuracy
within the law but also as a proactive choice to protect Internet
stability.
CONCLUSION
The future of the DNS is still in flux. With the impending
transfer of the root zone file away from US-government control,
potential for a reorganization or rethinking of TLD ownership is
high. Because TLDs undergird and enable the smooth function-
ing of the Internet as a whole, settling on a coherent and clear
theory of TLD ownership has enormous implications.
None of the theories recognized by US courts seems wholly
able to account for the normative considerations presented by
TLDs. Some hybrid solution of the abstract-property theory and
the service theory might avoid the worst outcomes: TLDs might
be seen as property in some -areas of law and not others. Howev-
er, this solution is unwieldy and unpredictable, and it would re-
quire the determination of TLDs' property status to be made
270 It may be that no single body, including ICANN, is fully trustworthy as a gate-
keeper for the DNS-in which case agreements between the international community
and ICANN that enforce some accountability, rather than ad hoc decisionmaking, would
be necessary. See Sonbuchner, Note, 17 Minn J Intl L at 205 (cited in note 55).
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afresh each time it is raised in litigation. Instead, courts should
opt for a view of TLDs that draws comparisons to similar struc-
tures in licensing law: for example, broadcast licenses strongly
resemble TLD-registry agreements and address the normative
concerns of the DNS well. TLDs involve a complex interplay of
public and private rights, and licensing law is adept at navi-
gating this dynamic.

